





WITHDRAWN

5
Band

"The greater part of the life of Count Max Montgelas has been spent in the military service of Bavaria and the German Empire. . . . When the World War broke out General Montgelas's division took part in a number of the more significant early encounters, such as the battles of Lorraine, Somme and Ypres. He was wounded near Lunéville late in August, 1914, but quickly returned to the front. . . . In 1915 he was obliged to retire from active military service because of differences of opinion with the German High Command. He retired to Switzerland, where he got in touch with some leading German pacifists and became critical of some of the more bellicose and unyielding German leaders of this period.

"At the close of the War Montgelas served as one of the experts appointed to prepare the German rejoinder to the Entente indictment at Versailles and was appointed an expert to aid in the Parliamentary Inquiry into the causes of the World War. . . ."



BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER
SIR EDWARD GREY

SOME BORZOI BOOKS
OF INTEREST TO HISTORIANS

THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR

by Harry Elmer Barnes

NAPOLEON III AND THE RHINE

by Hermann Oncken

LATIN AMERICA AND WORLD POLITICS

by J. Fred Rippy

A HISTORY OF CANADA

by Carl Wittke

A HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST IN
MODERN TIMES

by Harold M. Vinacke

A HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM
1500 TO 1815

by James E. Gillespie

MODERN WORLD HISTORY,
1776 TO 1926

by Alexander C. Flick

NEW YORK: ALFRED A. KNOPF: 1928



Max Montgomerie

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
UNDER
SIR EDWARD GREY

COUNT MAX MONTGELAS



TRANSLATED BY WILLIAM C. DREHER
EDITED, WITH A FOREWORD, BY
HARRY ELMER BARNES



62320

NEW YORK : ALFRED A. KNOPF : 1928

Copyright 1928 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

THESE VOLUMES CONTAIN
THE
STORY OF THE
CITY OF ALBANY

Manufactured in the United States of America

Foreword

BY

HARRY ELMER BARNES

I

The author of this lucid and concise study of British diplomacy before the World War is one of the most distinguished of contemporary Bavarians. His grandfather, Count Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas, was the great reforming minister in Bavaria in the Napoleonic period. His achievements corresponded to those of Stein and Hardenburg in Prussia. His work has been described by no less an authority than Sir Adolphus William Ward as "the complete transformation of Bavaria from a feudal and patrimonial into a modern state." The father of the author, Count Louis Montgelas, also filled many positions of trust in the Bavarian government, among them that of Minister to Russia. It was while on this mission that his son Max was born in St. Petersburg in 1860.

The greater part of the life of Count Max Montgelas has been spent in military service of Bavaria and the German Empire. He entered the army in 1879 at the age of nineteen, and was commissioned a lieutenant in the following year. From 1886 to 1888 he was military

V

67820

Foreword

instructor and aide-de-camp to Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. From 1888 to 1892 he was stationed at the Bavarian Military Academy. From 1892 to 1900 he alternated between staff work and regimental duties. In 1900 he was sent to China as commander of the Bavarian battalion which formed a part of the German field force dispatched to help suppress the Boxer Movement. He remained in the Orient until 1903 as German military attaché in Peking, during which period he travelled extensively in Chinese territory, at one time going up the Yangtse to the frontier of Szechuan and later crossing the desert of Gobi. Returning to Germany he continued his military career, being made a Major-General and commander of an infantry brigade in 1908. From 1910 to 1912 he was "Oberquartiermeister" in the General Staff in Berlin. From 1912 to 1914 he was commander of the Fourth Bavarian Division. In 1897 Count Montgelas married Countess Pauline Wimpffen, daughter of Count Felix Wimpffen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to France, and his wife Countess Margaret Lynar, formerly lady-in-waiting to Queen Augusta of Prussia.

When the World War broke out General Montgelas's division took part in a number of the more significant early encounters, such as the battles of Lorraine, Somme, and Ypres. He was wounded near Lunéville late in August, 1914, but quickly returned to the front. In November, 1914, he was made "Etappeninspecteur" of the Sixth German Army commanded by Crown Prince Rupprecht. In 1915 he was obliged to retire from active military service because of differences of opinion

Foreword

with the German High Command. He retired to Switzerland where he got in touch with many leading German pacifists and became critical of some of the more bellicose and unyielding German leaders of this period.

At the close of War Montgelas served as one of the experts appointed to prepare the German rejoinder to the Entente indictment at Versailles and was appointed an expert to aid in the Parliamentary Inquiry into the causes of the World War. He was co-editor with Walter Schücking and Karl Kautsky of the German Documents on the Outbreak of the War, generally known as the "Kautsky Documents." He has recently aided in preparing a new and enlarged edition of the German documents, the nature of which he has described in the "Kriegsschuldfrage" for August, 1927. He is also the author of the first standard German work on the causes of the World War, the famous Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage, known in English translation as The Case for the Central Powers. Montgelas is now at work on a comprehensive volume dealing with the causes, course, and immediate results of the World War, which will be published in the Borzoi Historical Series.

Montgelas's writings on the question of responsibility for the World War are notable both for the extent and precision of the author's knowledge of the details of the crisis and for the fair-mindedness and judicial air which are always in evidence. He never fails to be generous to his opponents and is not at all reluctant to reveal and condemn German blunders and misrepresentations. It may safely be said that no other written in this field approaches Montgelas for instant command

Foreword

*of detailed chronological and documentary information concerning the events of the crisis of 1914, and yet this vast knowledge is under such perfect control that it in no way impedes lucidity of expression or masterly organization of the material. He invariably handles his subject in such a manner as to make clear the outstanding developments and issues involved. The trees of diplomatic detail never obscure the forests of general developments or outstanding policies. In discussions during an international conference of a week's duration in the summer of 1926, attended by experts on the war guilt question, as well as in listening to private criticisms of his own work on *The Genesis of the World War*, the present writer was able to observe and admire the poise and objectivity which Montgelas constantly maintains in the midst of this highly controversial subject of responsibility for the great conflict of yesterday.*

Because of his critical attitude toward certain members of the German High Command from 1914 onward and because of his tendency at one time to accept the metaphysical and moralistic view of some pacifists that immediate political and diplomatic responsibility for the World War represents a superficial view of the problem, Montgelas has been accused of vacillation and indecision, some critics, such as Grelling, branding him as a turncoat. Such an interpretation is both unfair and inaccurate. Subsequent developments have proved that his military views were sound, and nothing is more firmly established than the wisdom of a negotiated peace. Nor does Montgelas's present view of the pri-

Foreword

mary responsibility of Serbia, Russia, and France for the precipitation of the World War in any way conflict with his conception of the more fundamental and far-reaching causes of the World War and of war in general. Nothing could be more natural than for any honest and intelligent man to change his opinions concerning war guilt in these last ten years, which have witnessed such an unprecedented revelation of facts through the publication of the secret documents in the foreign offices of the various states that participated in the great conflict. Only those with the gift of prophecy, who arrive at truth by anticipatory intuition, and those with minds closed to facts which run counter to their emotions and prejudices could well avoid a radical transformation of their views on this subject, once the vast body of revolutionary documentary material had been spread before their eyes. It would seem that Montgelas should be congratulated rather than criticized for having allowed an overwhelming mass of unquestionably valid evidence to reshape his views, instead of remaining, like Richard Grelling, Heinrich Kanner and others, a soured and ever more uncomfortable victim of his wartime passions and biases. It requires far more courage and intellectual honesty to take a position contrary to that once held than it does merely to swallow eagerly evidence in harmony with one's original stand.

II

All serious-minded students of the question of the responsibility for the World War will heartily welcome the collection and publication in English of Montgelas's

Foreword

penetrating and devastating studies of British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey. No phase of the war-time mythology so cries out for dissipation as the legend of the straitforward honesty, open diplomacy, vast diplomatic and international information, peace-loving labors, keen insight, and masterly decisiveness of the former British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Nowhere has less progress been made in revising war-time theories of responsibility than in Great Britain, and nowhere else is there such smug satisfaction with the part played by the governing group in 1914. Even many former critics are now silenced. Those dailies and weeklies which sharply criticized Grey in 1914 have recently hailed his weak and evasive memoirs and the incriminating British Documents as an overwhelming vindication of the wisdom of the British Foreign Office in July and August, 1914. This they do even though these two publications actually show that the critics of Grey in 1914 were wise and accurate far beyond any knowledge which they could possibly have possessed at the outbreak of the conflict. Indeed, there is almost everywhere in England today a pontifical and superior air about the whole question of war guilt which is more irritating to the objective student of the subject than any attitude to be discovered elsewhere in Europe.¹ A

¹ In writing this indictment of British stubbornness in adhering to the mythology of the war days, the author is not unconscious of, or ungrateful for, the brilliant and courageous work of disillusionment executed in England by E. D. Morel, F. C. Conybeare, C. Raymond Beazley, Lord Loreburn, G. P. Gooch, Bertrand Russell, Norman Angell, M. Edith Durham, Irene Cooper Willis, Seymour Cocks and many others.

Foreword

Headlam-Morley in 1927 remains the same Headlam-Morley as in 1917, in spite of an alleged acquaintance with the European and American literature of war guilt and what should have been the illuminating task of editing the British Documents on the origins of the World War. One can contemplate the passionate and realistic speeches of M. Poincaré, reaffirming the Versailles version of war responsibility, with more equanimity than one can the "holier-than-thou" psychology which pervades so many influential English circles and leads even cultured and urbane Englishmen to affect an air of injured indignation when one suggests that England and her leaders may have been at one with the rest of the world in sharing the pre-War territorial and economic greed, obsessed patriotism, trust in superior armaments, and indulgence in secret and unscrupulously dishonest diplomacy. Poincaré at least has important vested interest of a territorial, economic, and political nature to protect through the perpetuation of the war-time illusions.

The keystone to this arch of British smugness and adamant blindness to the realities revealed in the source-material on the causes of the War is the myth of the majestic character and ability of Grey, who is alleged to have towered far above the avarice and duplicity which characterized the dominating personalities in the other European states, particularly those in charge of the destinies of the Central Powers. And this same view has lately spread rather widely in America, due in large part to the captivating memoirs of Viscount Grey of Fallodon, which are admittedly as

Foreword

disarming and convincing to the amateur student of pre-War diplomacy as they are disappointing and self-condemnatory in the eyes of the technically equipped scholar in the premises. Therefore, nothing which could be published in the English language could be more timely or cogent than a temperate but relentless exposure of the true nature of Grey and his diplomacy.

For this task Montgelas is well suited. His knowledge of the personalities and facts of European diplomacy, and his precision of statement differ widely from the astonishing ignorance of diplomatic facts and the vagueness and evasiveness of expression which are in evidence in Grey's writings on the causes of the War. At the same time, Montgelas is free from that passionate hatred of Grey, very common in Germany, and also characteristic of some of Grey's personal and party enemies in Britain. He thus escapes from the danger of overestimating the guilt of England and accepting that hypothesis of the diabolism of Grey which distorts the vision of so many German nationalists. While it may be less irritating, the hypothesis of Grey as the arch-villain of 1914 is no less removed from the truth than the almost universal British conception of the crystal-line integrity and angelic purity of purpose of the Viscount of Fallodon. While in no sense an apologist for Grey, the writer has never been able to agree that the one man who might have prevented the War and failed to do so is as guilty as the half-dozen men who deliberately took those positive steps which brought on the War. Deplorable as was Grey's failure to restrain Russia and counsel moderation upon France, his guilt

is certainly far less than that of Sazonov, Izvol'ski, Poincaré, Paul Cambon, and Paléologue. Montgelas approaches his subject with a decent open-mindedness, and analyzes Grey's apologia and his policies and behavior in 1914 with fairness and candor. The devastating indictment which results is not the product of prejudices or hatred but the inevitable outcome of casting the disconcerting search-light of factual realism upon the absorbing career and enticing apologetic writings of the man who controlled the world destinies of England in the decade before the War.

No one who pretends to a serious interest in the problem of how the War came can well refrain from a careful perusal of Montgelas's clear and pains-taking analysis, and no one who reads it can ever regain the same view of Grey and British policy that he might have possessed if his views were based chiefly upon our wartime illusions or upon Grey's account of things. Montgelas's little book is bound to assume at once a distinguished position in the literature of war guilt on account of the distinction and competence of the author, the opportuneness and relevance of the subject involved, and the magisterial nature of the treatment accorded to the problems in question. We only bespeak for it the open-minded reception which its quality entitles it to receive. Those who find their interest in the subject kindled by this brief and incisive treatment may well pass on to the more exhaustive and detailed study embodied in Hermann Lutz's masterly book, Lord Grey and the World War. An absorbing account of the genesis of the war legend in England may be found in Irene Cooper Willis's brilliant work, England's Holy War.

Contents

*

Foreword	v
----------	---

PART ONE

Lord Grey's Memoirs

Introductory	3
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 1892-1895	5
Out of Office, 1895-1905	8
Anglo-French Entente and Beginning of Military Con- ferences Early in 1905	11
The Algeciras Conference of 1906	15
The Second Hague Conference of 1907	17
Germany's Turkish Policy	19
The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907	22
The Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908-1909	23
King Edward's Travels	26
The Agadir Crisis of 1911	29
The German Army Law of 1913	32
Haldane's Mission to Berlin in the Spring of 1912	34

Contents

The Anglo-French Naval Convention and the Grey-Cambon Correspondence in the Fall of 1912	37
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913	40
Negotiations for an Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement (1914)	42
Development of the Straits Question (1908-1915)	46
The Proposal of a "Naval Holiday" in the Spring of 1914	49
Draft of an Anglo-German Colonial Agreement (1914)	50

*

PART TWO

The Crisis of July-August, 1914

The British Documents on the Origin of the War	57
The "Feeler" by Vienna of July 16	58
Direct Conversations between Austria and Russia	61
The First Thrust of Sir Eyre Crowe	62
The Franco-Russian Declaration of Solidarity	64
Crowe's Attack of July 25	66
England's Dependence upon Russia	70
Mobilization of the British Fleet	71
Encouragement of Russia by Grey and Nicolson	73
Was the Localization of the Austro-Serbian War Im-possible?	78
Russia and Serbia	84

Contents

Pinpricks against Germany in the Marginal Notes	85
The Mobilizations	88
London Hears of Russian Mobilization in Good Time, but Conceals the Information	92
Sensational French News	98
The British Decision	101
1. July 29	101
2. July 30	102
3. July 31	104
4. August 1	109
5. August 2	112
6. August 3	114
Details of the Final Days	115

*

P A R T T H R E E

Conclusions

Grey's Attitude and Germany's Policies	119
--	-----

*

P A R T F O U R

Notes

Part One	129
Part Two	137
Part Three	142

PART ONE

Lord Grey's Memoirs



INTRODUCTORY

MANY people have believed that Lord Grey, however much he may have erred in the means chosen, worked unremittingly throughout his entire official career to mitigate the Anglo-German antagonism which had grown more and more intense after the failure of the Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance from 1898 to 1901. They have even believed that he was willing to do justice to the reasonable claims of the German people for a position of influence in the world. To such persons Grey's *Twenty-five Years* must be a grievous disappointment.

Well-informed persons found many unusually attractive features in the private life of this scion of an old English noble family prominent in the "governing circles": his affectionate relations with his wife, who had been so suddenly torn from him by an accident; his chivalrous loyalty to his colleagues of the Cabinet and to his assistants in the Foreign Office; his joy in nature; his love for animals; the relative simplicity of his home.

Nevertheless, he lacked the capacity requisite for a statesman and the training essential for conducting foreign policy. He spoke no foreign languages; he was able only to read and to understand French, and this with difficulty. Of foreign countries he had seen only France. He does not admire the adage "*gouverner c'est*

prévoir" (to govern is to possess foresight). "If all secrets were known," he says, "it would probably be found that British Foreign Ministers have been guided by what seemed to them to be the immediate interest of this country without making elaborate calculations for the future." (Vol. I, p. 6).¹ To a man of that way of thinking, the problems in Germany's foreign policy necessarily remained a sealed book; he could have no understanding of Germany's situation in the heart of Europe, without natural boundaries and permanently under pressure on two fronts from mighty Continental neighbors. Bismarck, to whom Grey ascribes the rare gift of foreseeing the consequences of political actions (p. 15), pondered over his great problems again and again, often through sleepless nights. For Grey, on the contrary, the most difficult problem admitted of a simple solution. He thus saw in Chamberlain's suggestion of an Anglo-German alliance merely the joining of the greatest navy with the greatest army. That, he says, "is quite simple and clear" (p. 41). But such a judgment really over-simplifies matters. Moreover, it must be remarked that Germany never did possess the "greatest" army; the German army was always smaller than that of Russia, and in 1914 it did not even exceed the French army.²

The merit of being an exact and trustworthy writer of history will, likewise, hardly be accorded to Grey by posterity. Even if one takes into consideration the regrettable fact that he was prevented by an eye trouble from personally looking through the overwhelming flood

¹ See Notes at the end of the book.

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs

of proofs of this jeopardizing of world peace through French and Russian intrigues, one is nevertheless astonished at his numerous lapses of memory and his meager knowledge of events before and even during his term of office.

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs 1892-1895

DURING his term of office as Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Foreign Office, which he began at the age of thirty under Lord Rosebery, Grey's memory was particularly impressed by the following events.

According to Grey, at about the turn of the year 1892-1893 Germany addressed an extortionate "ultimatum" to England, with the threat that if England continued to interpose difficulties in the way of Germany's economic concession in Turkey, German support of British policy in Egypt would cease (pp. 9-11). In the first place, it should be pointed out that the British Ambassador at Constantinople, as Grey himself admits, promoted not only English but even French interests to the disadvantage of Germany. Moreover, the German note was by no means an ultimatum, nor was it regarded as such in London; for otherwise the German Ambassador, Count Hatzfeldt, could not have reported on February 8, 1893, that "Lord Rosebery repeated on this occasion how thankful he was for the benevolent attitude of the Imperial Government, as well as for that of the Cabinets of Rome and Vienna, toward his policy in Egypt." ³

With France and Russia, so Grey tells us further, Great Britain was living at that time in "constant friction" (p. 11). At the end of July, 1893, he indicates that a war almost broke out with France upon the occasion of a blockade of Siam by a French squadron. In this crisis Germany would apparently have been willing to give England armed support (p. 14, footnote).⁴

Still more sharp was the conflict of interest with France over West Africa and the Sudan, in regard to which Grey even declared in Parliament, on March 28, 1895, that the advance of a French expedition thither would be regarded by England as an "unfriendly act"—the meaning of which words in the language of British diplomacy is well known (p. 19, footnote).

In the case of the joint protest of Germany and France against the English agreement with the Congo Free State in 1894, Germany's objection to Article III, through which England intended to take a lease on a strip of the Belgian Congo along the western frontier of German East Africa (which would have completely cut off Germany's access to the great lakes in the interior), is recognized by Grey as fully justified, inasmuch as England, ostensibly owing to ignorance of the documents, was violating a previous agreement with Germany. The French protest, on the other hand, which referred to other points of the new agreement, is characterized as unjustifiable (pp. 21-22).⁵

The foregoing three points, along with the Russo-Franco-German protest against the conditions forced upon China by Japan in the Preliminary Peace of Shimonoeki, are, according to Grey's recollection, the most

important incidents in the first three years of his activity in the sphere of foreign politics. An unprejudiced mind might have drawn from such experiences some such conclusions as the following:

The German Empire is willing permanently to support, and to induce her allies in the Triple Alliance to support, the position of England in Egypt, rendered possible through Germany's victory over France, notwithstanding its conflict with international law. As *quid pro quo* Germany demands only that England shall not obstruct the economic interests of a friendly Germany in other parts of the Orient to the advantage of a France living in "constant friction" with England. Germany apparently is even willing, in case of an Anglo-Italian war with France, to give active support to her Italian ally. The maintenance of a good understanding with Germany and with the entire Triple Alliance is therefore of vital importance to British policy.

Grey thought otherwise: "I soon became aware," he says "that the policy of friendship with the Triple Alliance, however satisfactory it might be to the Governments of Germany, Austria, and Italy, was not altogether comfortable for ourselves" (p. 9). This view, which led inevitably and with logical consistency into the Franco-Russian camp, was adopted by Grey at a time when the German navy was still an entirely negligible factor, whereas the British admiralty was anxiously watching the growth of the French and Russian sea-power and being forced to make great increases in armament against it.⁶

Out of Office, 1895-1905

IN REGARD to this decade Grey later heard incidentally not a few interesting comments. Nevertheless, he did not find the leisure, after his return to office at the end of 1905, to read for himself the documents covering that period (p. 34). Inasmuch as he also purposely abstained from reading those documents when he came to write his recollections, it is easy to understand that his book contains little that was not previously known. Of his brief description, therefore, only the following points will be discussed.

The beginning of a new German naval policy is placed in 1900, the year of the second Navy Law (p. 46) which shows that the first Navy Law (1897) had had no injurious effect of any kind upon Anglo-German relations. This is also proved by the negotiations for an alliance which began immediately after the adoption of this Navy Law.

The Boer War is defended by Grey even to this day (p. 44). From the standpoint of the imperialistic policy represented by him, he has a perfect right to defend it. It may be observed, however, that men who think in that way should not talk too much about the "protection of the small nations." It is true that the indignation over the rape of the South African republics found lively expression in wide circles of the German people; but that this indignation was "even stronger" in Germany than elsewhere (p. 45) is disproved by Chamberlain's first speech at Leicester on November 29, 1899, in which he sharply warned the Paris press to abstain from its attacks upon the "sacred person of the Queen," and

added: "England has reason to congratulate herself that the worst outbreaks did not appear in the German press." ⁷

Grey should have mentioned the fact that from the very start the German Government tried to exert a moderating influence upon the German press and informed the London Cabinet that Germany would place no difficulties in the path of England.⁸ Furthermore, the Berlin Government rejected repeated Franco-Russian proposals for an intervention not agreeable to England.⁹ Finally Emperor William, precisely at the time of the worst defeats of the British troops (November, 1899), paid a visit to his grandmother—a visit which was at that time extraordinarily appreciated by the public opinion of England.

The Prince of Wales early in 1900, also, expressed himself to the effect that "England should forget neither the recent visit of his Majesty the Kaiser, nor the fact that it was due to the general attitude of the German Government that no (European) intervention took place." ¹⁰

The fact has already been mentioned that Grey regarded the Anglo-German alliance as far too simple a problem. Of these negotiations, which lasted nearly three years, he mentions only Chamberlain's speech of November 30, 1899, in which the latter spoke of "a new triple alliance between the Teutonic race and the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race" (p. 41). The testimony of Sir Edward that he heard nothing either at that time or later as to how far Chamberlain was authorized to speak in the name of Lord Salisbury and his other colleagues, is worthy of attention. He might

have added how violently his own party, the Liberals, even at that time had condemned Chamberlain's first speech at Birmingham, May, 1898, on the alliance question;¹¹ how sarcastically *The Times* as an organ of public opinion, after the speech of November 30 at Leicester, expressed itself about the alliance idea; and what strenuous opposition that speech called forth in the United States.¹²

These weighty opposition voices—which, by the way, are not mentioned in the recollections of Baron von Eckardstein—necessarily warned the leaders of German policy to exercise great caution.

The assertion that the Anglo-French Colonial Agreement of April, 1904, was immediately "all made public, except a clause or two of no importance," is an especially striking example of Grey's weakness of memory (p. 49). The truth is that the secret clauses contained the exact opposite of the guarantees of independence to Egypt and Morocco given in the public treaty—a piece of duplicity that was most sharply denounced in the French Chamber, and later in the Senate, after it was divulged in the fall of 1911.¹³ Grey exults over the agreement: "The exasperating friction with France was to end, the menace of a war with France had disappeared" (p. 50). Did not another danger, however, arise as soon as this Colonial Agreement had become an entente with military conversations? Responsibility for the fact that the agreement became an entente is attributed to "subsequent attempts of Germany to shake or break it" (p. 51). As immediate attempts of this kind, Grey mentions the landing of Emperor William at Tangier and the German pressure upon France for the

dismissal of Minister Delcassé. Both steps certainly give grounds for criticism of Germany, but they were directed, not against the published agreement, but against its secret clauses, about which enough had leaked out by the fall of 1904 to justify a German protest. When this protest was made, Bebel remarked in the Reichstag that he was astonished that Germany was so late in asserting her rights.¹⁴

The Russo-Japanese War brought Grey to realize how harsh had been England's treatment of Russia. "In the Near East access to the Mediterranean Sea had been barred to her, notably by Britain under Lord Beaconsfield. Lord Lansdowne, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, had lately made a declaration that was a warning not to touch the Persian Gulf. That barred the Middle East outlet to a warm sea" (p. 54). That is a very correct judgment. In this steadfast exclusion of a nation of over one hundred millions from the world's seas lies, in fact, the great historic sin of England; in it are lodged the ultimate roots of the World War. It will prove interesting to follow what Grey did later, when he was in a position of authority, to atone for this treatment recognized by him as severe.

*Anglo-French Entente
and Beginning of Military Conferences
Early in 1905*

WHEN Grey, at the beginning of 1905, entered the Cabinet of Campbell-Bannerman as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Algeciras Conference was near at hand. Franco-German relations were strained. At the end of

the month Colonel Repington, the military editor of *The Times*, wrote to inform Sir Edward of the substance of an interview which he had had (with the knowledge and approval of Lord Lansdowne, Grey's predecessor in office) with the French Military Attaché. The new Minister for Foreign Affairs replied: "I abandon nothing that Lord Lansdowne said to the French, and I do not hesitate to confirm it."¹⁵ Did a Cabinet decision precede this assurance? Was the Cabinet informed of it even after the event?

Then, on January 10, the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, put the portentous question: What would be Britain's attitude if the negotiations between Germany and France should lead to a breach? A formal Anglo-French alliance was neither necessary nor expedient, he said, but it was of the greatest importance for France to know whether Great Britain, in case of a German attack upon France, would be willing to give armed assistance to France. Grey's answer was that, according to his personal view, public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favor of France; nevertheless, he was not able to obligate himself to anything more than neutrality. Cambon answered that a promise of neutrality "did not, of course, satisfy him," and that he would repeat his question after the English elections. Meanwhile he regarded it as advisable that "unofficial communications between our [the British] Admiralty and War Office and the French Naval and Military Attachés should take place as to what action might advantageously be taken in case the two countries found themselves in alliance in such a war. Some communications had, he believed, already passed, and might,

he thought, he continued." Grey did not oppose this ("I did not dissent from this view"). Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman, as well as Lord Ripon, the leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Lords, received a record of the conversation (pp. 70-72).

In the middle of January, accordingly, it was decided that the exchange of ideas about an Anglo-French war upon Germany should no longer be conducted through the unofficial intermediation of Colonel Repington, but through the direct contact of the French Military Attaché with the London War Office, just as had already been going on between the French Naval Attaché and the British Admiralty in respect to operations at sea (p. 74). Grey had thus not only carried out the promises of Lansdowne, but had substantially exceeded them. What did the Cabinet know about it?

On the last day of January, Cambon repeated the question that he had asked on the 10th. Sir Edward, who had meanwhile spoken with the Prime Minister, emphasized three points. In the first place, "a good deal of progress" had been made. The military and naval authorities had been in communication with the French, and Grey assumed that "if a crisis arose, no time would have been lost for want of a formal engagement." In the second place, in the event of a German attack upon France arising out of the Morocco Agreement, public feeling in England would be so strong that "no British Government could remain neutral." In the third place, France had (without an alliance) a perfectly free hand and could be sure of the unreserved diplomatic support of England. If, on the other hand, England should promise more than diplomatic support, England would

have to be consulted in regard to France's Morocco policy and, in case of necessity, "be free to press upon the French Government concessions or alterations of their policy" (p. 77).

This is an admission that France, precisely because no formal alliance had been concluded and for the moment only diplomatic support had been promised, acquired much more freedom of action for her policy in Morocco than she would have enjoyed under a firm alliance. In this freedom of action, under this blank check given to France, there lay—not recognized by Grey at that time—the danger to peace.¹⁶ On the day after the basis for a war-alliance was thus laid, Sir Edward wrote to his wife: "I do not know that I did well, but I did honestly" (p. 79). Campbell-Bannerman understood the case better; he feared that the military conversations would create an "obligation," or at least an "honorable understanding" (p. 83). Grey, after the event, agreed with this criticism by saying: "With more experience I might have shared that apprehension at the time." Unfortunately Campbell-Bannerman let the reins drop from his hands; unfortunately, also, Grey's insight came too late. No wonder that his private secretary could say on February 2: "Cambon appears satisfied." And Cambon was "of course not satisfied" with a simple declaration of neutrality, as Grey reported on January 10!

The fact that all this went on between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty is a matter pertaining wholly to the internal affairs of England. With respect to this point Grey feels his guilt more clearly: "My answer now would be that I

ought to have asked for a Cabinet." A foreigner is not interested in this constitutional question. He may point out, however, that there can be no talk of "Parliamentary Government" when such matters can be negotiated and decided without the foreknowledge of Parliament or even of the Cabinet.

The Algeciras Conference of 1906

THE point of special interest in Grey's description of this meeting is his extraordinary astonishment when, during the conference, France suddenly complained that she was not being adequately supported by England (pp. 102ff). One is astonished to observe in what extravagant language assurances of England's fidelity are given: "Cordial coöperation with France in all parts of the world (!) is a cardinal point of British policy" (p. 105). Did Germany ever give such assurances to Austria? And an Englishman might ask if France ever gave similar assurances to England.

That Germany yielded on all essential points at the conference is well known (p. 109). This conciliatory attitude of Germany was manifested at a time when Russia was completely paralyzed in a military way through the defeats in Manchuria and the revolution at home, and when the British expeditionary force of not more than 80,000 men, according to the testimony of War Minister Haldane, would have required two months to prepare for operations on French soil.¹⁷

In vain does one look in the work under examination for a recognition of such love of peace or, if one prefers, of Germany's timidity in defending its interests.

A few months later (summer of 1906) German mayors and representatives of the press made friendly visits to England, in order to improve the feeling between the two countries. The French Ambassador grossly lied to Grey in representing that the German Government had informed Paris that an "entente" between England and Germany was proceeding (p. 110). As a matter of fact, Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador in Paris, in accordance with his instructions, had spoken, not of an "entente," but of a "détente" (relaxation of tension—Tr.). When Grey caused to be laid before him the memorandum of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the conversation with Radolin, it turned out that the word "entente" was not in it, but "*rapprochement*," which, though weaker, was still somewhat too strong (p. 111). Instead of censuring Cambon's incorrect expression, however, Grey wrote to Paris that "there was nothing in the nature of an entente between the two countries (Germany and England), nor was there anything out of which an entente might be made." The Secretary of State does not fail to add that he did not personally see the German editors.

Three weeks later, on July 31, Count Metternich, the German Ambassador, had a serious conversation with Grey: "The policy of ententes, from which Germany is excluded and which are designed to create in Europe a counterpoise to Germany's power, is uncertain in its execution and dangerous in its results. A simpler and safer means for maintaining the equilibrium and the peace of Europe would be to take Germany into this system of ententes. As long, however, as in England the efforts from the German side to bring about a *rap-*

The Second Hague Conference of 1907

prochement are rejected from fear of displeasing the French, it appears to me that here (in London) the policy of creating a counterpoise is preferred to that of bringing Germany into the circle of friendships." The Secretary of State answered this evasively. To the question whether friendly relations with Germany would be compatible with England's friendship for France, his answer was equally evasive.¹⁸

It was precisely friendship with France "in all parts of the world" that weighed more heavily than anything else with Grey as a politician; it must not be disturbed by a *rapprochement* to Germany. Grey as a historian does not see the lie of the French Ambassador, but he perceives a German intrigue that existed only in his imagination.

In order to allay French and English suspicions, German visits of friendship were discontinued. On the part of England, Minister of War Haldane went to Berlin in the fall of the same year (1906), in order to testify friendship for Germany, and to inform himself in the Prussian War Office about "organization for rapid mobilization" ¹⁹—knowledge that might be utilized with advantage in the "non-committal" preparations for a possible war with Germany.

The Second Hague Conference of 1907

WHEN Prince Bülow published his *Deutsche Politik*, pacifist writers sharply criticized the fact that he made no mention of the two Hague Conferences. Earl Grey also passes over in silence the Second Hague Conference, which occurred during his term of office, but without

calling forth similar criticism. Indeed, no laurels were won at that time by the Foreign Office. Thus Bertha von Suttner, the well-known leader of German Pacifists, writes:

The American and English friends of peace were most painfully affected by the lukewarm and negative attitude of the British delegation. In his fearless manner Stead gave expression to his disappointment—or rather, his indignation—over this fact. From the Liberal Government of Great Britain which, through the mouth of the Prime Minister as well as that of Sir Edward Grey, had so strongly urged that England should place herself at the head of a peace-league of nations, a different rôle at the Hague Conference had indeed been expected. Stead suggested action on the part of members of Parliament; and in fact a deputation did go to Campbell-Bannerman and Minister Grey to interview them. Stead himself went to London and found out what was wrong: the instructions given to the British delegation had been drawn up by functionaries of the Foreign Office who had remained over in their positions from the previous imperialistic régime, and in this spirit they had obligated the delegates to the passive and negative attitude that they were manifesting at the Hague. Now the matter was cleared up, and the Prime Minister himself sent fresh instructions; so that the British delegates now—not only to the satisfaction of the Conference, but also to their own—took their stand in the most liberal manner for the permanent tribunal and similar proposals.²⁰

It is a curious case—this explanation that throws all the blame upon subordinate officials who had not yet become accustomed to the ideas of their new superiors. Not only the Foreign Secretary himself, but also his Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Charles Hardinge,²¹ had already been in office a year and a half. The instruc-

tions of the British delegates, signed by Grey himself on June 12, 1907, were as colorless as possible.²² Of seven large pages, six and one-half are devoted to regulations for land and sea warfare, the application of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare, the use of commercial vessels for war purposes, the rights of neutrals, the question of private property at sea, and similar matters. Only a half-page with the promising title of "Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes"—promising much but accomplishing little—is devoted to the Russian proposal for the better development of the "International Commissions of Inquiry," the Prize Court for neutrals, and the use of different languages at the Conference. Not a single new idea, not a syllable about arbitration.

Germany's Turkish Policy

THE chapter "Akaba and Denshawai" is instructive in three respects. It shows how quick a British Government has been—even where the legal question involved is very doubtful—in launching an ultimatum against weak nations whenever there is a question of asserting ostensible or real interests (Akaba, pp. 119–122). This chapter further shows with what immoderate rigor the offenses of natives against the lives or property of British subjects are punished in subjugated lands (Denshawai, pp. 130–134).

Of chief interest, however, are Grey's remarks on Germany's Turkish policy, for they reveal the true ground for English ill-will toward Germany. The German Gov-

ernment and the German Emperor—such is Grey's complaint—paid the price which "no British Government could pay," which consisted in not disturbing the misgovernment of Sultan Abdul Hamid. Thus Germany secured at Constantinople the position once held by Great Britain. "German policy seems to have been based upon a deliberate belief that moral scruples and altruistic motives do not count in international affairs. . . . The highest morality, for a German Government, was the national interest. . . . The methods by which Germany pushed her policy in Turkey did indeed seem to us cynical" (pp. 127-129).²³

We need not take this curtain lecture too tragically, for it makes a curious impression, suspended as it is between the Akaba and Denshawai incidents, which in point of fact were not "sicklied o'er" with altruism. Besides, it is a strong self-accusation, for in the first chapter of his book (p. 6) Grey says that "British Foreign Ministers have been guided by what seemed to them to be the immediate interests of the country." The violence of his language reveals the nature of the chief grievances of the London Cabinet against Germany. The "naval scares" did good service as propaganda material with the mass of the nation; but the leading men knew very well that a serious threat against Great Britain's maritime supremacy by the far inferior German sea-power was absolutely out of the question. On the other hand, they seem to have entertained the suspicion that Turkey, regenerated under German guidance and allied with Germany, might prove a menace to British rule in India. This is incomprehensible to anybody who knows the geographical situation. Ever and

again in Grey's book there recurs his complaint about the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion which had poisoned the relations among the Powers. Very well, then, it would seem that in Downing Street distrust and suspicion were stronger than geography.

It goes without saying that the building of the German navy also, according to Grey's book, had a very decisive influence upon the general course of British policy. Germany started a "naval programme, which everybody considered a challenge to the British fleet. . . . Germany increased this naval competition and rejected, sometimes even resented, English overtures for a naval agreement (p. 234). . . . Germany was aiming at a position on the sea which must have been a most serious danger to the British Empire. . . . She compelled us to find safety both by increasing our naval construction and by adopting a policy which would not leave us exposed to the hostility of other naval powers" (p. 240).

It is a fact, of course, that the Anglo-French Naval Agreement of September, 1912, which constituted—as will be shown later—the strongest strategic engagement of England to France, was also a consequence of the latest German Navy Law. But Grey's criticism of the German naval policy sounds considerably milder than that of Germany's Turkish policy. Germany was "undoubtedly within her rights in challenging our sea-power" (p. 240). Building a navy is represented as only *unwise*. Germany's Turkish policy, on the other hand, is condemned with *moral* arguments. In Grey's remarks, however, one will search in vain for answers to the following questions: Why is it wrong to reorga-

nize the Turkish army, and why is it all right to reform the Turkish navy as England was then doing? Why is the building of German railways in Turkey an imperialist undertaking, and why were the English and French roads purely economic ventures? Why is German trade with Turkey (amounting to 460 million piasters in exports and imports) morally unwarrantable, and why is French trade, which was twice as great (882 millions), and British trade, three times as great (1356 millions), morally unobjectionable? The reproach directed against Germany for supporting the misgovernment of the tyrant Abdul Hamid is a subterfuge that will impress only those readers who have forgotten that Abdul Hamid had ceased to reign in the fall of 1908.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907

FRIENDSHIP with France and enmity with Russia were in the long run incompatible. The points at issue in East Asia with the Empire of the Tsar had been disposed of by the Japanese victories; those in Central Asia were settled by the agreement of August, 1907, concerning Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia—countries that belonged neither to Russia nor to England. Its most important part related to Persia, the southern part of which England, in her fear of ghosts, regarded as offering an opening for a Russian attack upon India. So they reached an agreement to divide that important land, without its permission, into three zones, whereof the northern was characterized as a Russian, and the

Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908-1909

southern as a British, "sphere of influence," while the central, including the Persian Gulf, was called "neutral." Grey admits that "the 'integrity and independence' of Persia, so tenderly cherished in the Preamble, did not exist in practice when the agreement was made" (p. 161). Especially the Russian agents are represented as proceeding very brutally and upon their own initiative; for "Russian Government was a despotism without discipline" (p. 162). Grey recognizes and emphasizes anew what a hardship it was for Russia, after having been driven from the sea in the Far East, to find the outlet to an ice-free sea also blocked in the Middle East.²⁴ But it was Grey himself who created that hardship, because with him the strategic frontier of India, which he professed to believe was threatened, outweighed his consideration for the vital necessities of Russian economic interests. He also foresees correctly that Russia "at the first opportunity would talk to us about the Straits in the Near East" (Bosphorus and Dardanelles, p. 155). One might expect, accordingly, that when this occasion should arise, the London Cabinet would go far toward meeting Russia's wishes.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908-1909

THINGS came to pass as Grey and all thoughtful politicians had anticipated. Russia, pressed back from the Asiatic seas, turned her attention again to her old aims in the Balkans. In the conversation at Buchlau, of which Grey appears to know nothing, Aehren-

thal and Isvolski had agreed upon the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austro-Hungary, and, as the reward for Russia, the free passage of her war vessels through the Straits. This transaction was certainly not free from objections from the standpoint of strict morality, yet it was thoroughly reasonable in the *milieu* of the old diplomacy, far more creditable, in fact, than the double-dealing Anglo-French Agreement of 1904. It would, moreover, have been conducive to peace, for such a Russian success at the Straits would have satisfied the self-esteem and imperialistic interests of the St. Petersburg diplomacy for years to come.

After Austro-Hungary had proclaimed the annexation, in the early part of October, 1908, and Bulgaria had declared her independence, Isvolski—who in consequence of unfortunate accidents had not been informed in good time by Aehrenthal²⁵—laid before the London Cabinet Russia's modest wish—that Russia and the other Riverain Powers on the Black Sea should have a right of way through the Straits; that there might be regulations that not more than three vessels should go through at a time and that no other vessels should go through for twenty-four hours after the first (p. 178). But the British Secretary of State demanded an equal right for other Powers. In other words, in case of an Anglo-Russian war, even though Turkey should remain neutral, the British should have the right to pursue Russian ships into the Black Sea and smash them (p. 173). Upon Isvolski's further urgency Grey gave the classic answer: "I told him I had not given him

the negative answer which he had deprecated. On the other hand, it was very difficult to give him a positive answer" (p. 176).²⁶

London's refusal was a severe blow to Isvolski's ambition. The wrath of the Russian minister, however, turned, not upon mighty Albion, but upon the weak Austro-Hungarian Empire. So recently as October 5 he had said to the Serbian representative at Paris: "Serbia and the Serbian people will lose nothing, but will really gain. . . . I foresaw this action by Austria-Hungary. . . . For that reason I made our consent dependent upon the above-mentioned condition (evacuation of the Sanjak)." ²⁷ Of quite a different tenor was the report made eight days later (October 13) by the Serbian representative at London: "Isvolski did not conceal his anger at Austria and protested most energetically against the assertion that he had consented to the annexation." ²⁸ This is clear proof that the Russian Minister changed his attitude in London.

That it was not Bosnia but the Straits question which caused the excitement in England at that time was clearly recognized by the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, who reported: "In the background of the excitement here lurks the Straits question—the fear lest Russia now come to the front." ²⁹

This repeated harshness of England in regard to a Russian wish, which the Austrian Minister had agreed to although his country was much more directly concerned, brought Europe at that time to the threshold of war. Russia's final yielding at the end of March, 1909, aroused the highest indignation of Sir Arthur

Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg³⁰ (pp. 182-183), who soon after this became Grey's principal assistant.

The execution of the Buchlau decisions might have contributed much toward moderating the Austro-Russian antagonism. That this did not take place, but that, on the contrary, the opposition between Vienna and St. Petersburg became greatly aggravated, was due to this English harshness—along with unfortunate mishaps and Isvolski's bungling. Even to this day Grey does not yet recognize his peace-disturbing blunder of October, 1908. He writes at length about the humiliation of Russia, but he does not see that in the last analysis this was caused, not by Germany's intervention at St. Petersburg, but by England's "No" to Isvolski.

King Edward's Travels

GREY's assertion that King Edward's travels were not designed for "going into deep political waters" will cause great astonishment to both German and non-German readers (pp. 146 and 195 ff.). Certainly these visits made quite a different impression in Germany at the time, and not exclusively in nationalist circles. Thus "Vorwärts" (the Socialist party organ—Tr.) wrote in 1907: "It would be very useful if our comrades in the English Parliament should speak up seriously. The activity of King Edward is not favorable for peace." In the same year the "Berliner Tageblatt" expressed this judgment: "The excessive zeal with which King Edward pursued his political business necessarily

aroused all the greater suspicion with us, since England at the same time thrust the disarmament question into the foreground with an emphasis that reminds one of the verse: 'If you refuse to be my friend, Your skull I'll smash and make an end.' "

Grey at the same time denounces the German theory of "encirclement" and expresses the opinion that the German Government never seriously believed in it (p. 196). At any rate the "Vorwärts" believed in it, for it wrote in 1907: "It is not an evidence of political insight when people only now discover that Germany has been politically isolated or, as it is called in the present-day political jargon, 'encircled,' by the Western Powers, especially by England."³¹ Grey, with special emphasis attempts to contradict the assertion that King Edward tried to entice Emperor Francis Joseph away from the alliance with Germany. "If we intrigued to break up the Triple Alliance, our contention that the Entente was entirely defensive and was not directed against Germany would cease to be true" (p. 195). But nobody can deny that France, at least, was exerting herself to break up the Triple Alliance and that her attempts to do so, inaugurated by the Franco-Italian agreement of 1902, were continued even after the Entente with England. The assertion that the Entente was entirely defensive and not directed against Germany is thereby refuted by Grey's own argument.

As to the efforts of King Edward to influence Emperor Francis Joseph, Grey remarks that Hardinge's report on the conversation at Ischl has been published. There appears to be a mistake here, as it has not been

possible to find any such report.³² Moreover, the King visited the Austrian Emperor not once but four times (1904, 1905, 1907, and 1908); hence one report would prove nothing. Finally, Grey's assertion is contradicted by the conclusive testimony of Fieldmarshal Baron von Conrad and Lieutenant Fieldmarshal von Margutti.³³

The meeting of King Edward with the Russians at Reval is also represented as harmless. But at one important point a divergence of no trivial character between the reports of Hardinge and Isvolski is to be noted. The utterance in question made by the British Under-Secretary was as follows:

ACCORDING TO HARDINGE'S
REPORT:

"In seven or eight years' time (with the German naval construction continuing) a critical situation might arise, in which Russia, if strong in Europe, might be the arbiter of peace, and have much more influence in securing the peace of the world than at any Hague Conference" (Grey, p. 205).

ACCORDING TO ISVOLSKI'S
REPORT:

"In seven or eight years an extremely disquieting and strained situation may arise in Europe. Then Russia without doubt will be arbiter of the situation. For that reason we wish, in the interests of peace and the maintenance of the balance (of power), that Russia shall be as strong as possible on land and water." (B. von Siebert, *Entente Diplomacy and the World War*. Edited by G. A. Schreiner.)

The Agadir Crisis of 1911

Isvolski's report alludes not only to the preservation of peace, but also to the balance of power, and emphasizes more sharply the position of Russia as arbiter and the necessity of her armaments on land and water. Who made the correct report—Hardinge or Isvolski?

The Agadir Crisis of 1911

"EVENTUALLY," says Grey, "France sent a force to Fez and Spain landed troops in her zone. Then suddenly the Germans sent a ship, the *Panther*, to Agadir" (p. 211). The events are placed in juxtaposition in this way, as if the German measure followed immediately upon those of France and Spain. As a matter of fact, the French had marched into the capital of Morocco on April 11, 1911. The French Government neglected for weeks—namely, until June 20—both the opening of conversations with Berlin regarding this breach of the Algeciras Act and the evacuation of Fez. It was under these circumstances, therefore, that the little German gunboat *Panther*, of 1000 tons and a crew of 125 men, was dispatched to the west coast of Morocco, where it cast anchor off Agadir on July 1. The proposition to send British and French warships to lie alongside the German boat or "even to occupy other Moroccan ports as a counter-stroke"—Agadir of course was not occupied, and not a man of the crew of 125 had been landed—³⁴ went too far, however, for Grey. Nevertheless, he has even today no word of blame for the originators (French or English?) of the plan,³⁵ although he sees clearly that this naval demonstration "would weigh the balance on the side of war" (p. 212).

Lloyd George's threatening Mansion House speech of July 21, called forth by the fact that a London question had been left unanswered by Berlin for a fortnight—not like German questions by Paris, for three months—was, according to Grey's book, exclusively the work of the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that time. The latter showed the finished draft of the speech to the head of the Foreign Office, who considered that there was nothing in the words that Germany could fairly resent (p. 216)! Grey felicitated himself that another Minister wanted to speak for him, for "a section, and a considerable section, of opinion in this country, looked upon the Foreign Office in general, and myself in particular as being unduly anti-German."³⁶ The speech had much to do with preserving the peace in 1911" (p. 217).

On the other hand, according to the German conception, this speech constituted the only incident that caused any special danger of war in the crisis of 1911.³⁷ When the German Secretary of State, von Kiderlen-Wächter, in a personal report addressed to the Emperor on July 15, incautiously used the expression that one "must put on a very bold front" if one wanted to get anything from France, the Emperor very severely censured his attitude.³⁸ In Berlin the threatening fanfaronade of Lloyd George caused the fear that England wanted war, and an effort was made, through confidential negotiations with Paris, to prevent this warlike temper from catching fire in France, where the more conciliatory Caillaux had taken office as Prime Minister on June 26.

Sir Edward himself was not of opinion at that time that it was necessary to preserve the peace in the pres-

ence of "Germany's will to war"; for on August 16 he declared to Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador: "I do not think that Emperor William wanted war when this incident arose. Neither do I believe that he wants war today."³⁹ Unfortunately Grey since seems to have completely forgotten this opinion of his; otherwise he could not have filled two pages with insinuations that Germany was working either for the diplomatic humiliation of France or for war. Not only does he not remember now what his view was in 1911, but—what is still more remarkable—it also wholly escaped his mind in 1911 as to how he had regarded affairs in Morocco in 1906. In January, 1906, he had regarded the concession to Germany of a port on Morocco's west coast as a means of solving all the difficulties of the Algeciras Conference (p. 114). Five years later, on the mere suspicion that Germany might be trying to obtain such a port, he sanctioned the war-speech of his ministerial colleague, a speech which no other great Power would have endured so patiently as did the German Empire.

However open to criticism the "Panther-leap" may be as a means for exercising diplomatic pressure, the fact nevertheless remains that the German Government preferred a grave diplomatic defeat, rightly characterized by Grey as "almost a fiasco" (p. 232), to war. At the same time, anybody who knows anything about the strength of the European armies and navies in 1911 must admit that the relative strengths, while no longer so favorable to the Central Powers as they had been in 1905-1906 or 1908-1909, were nevertheless substantially more favorable than in 1914 after France had

strengthened her active army by one, and the reserve army by four, yearly classes; after Russia had begun her "great program"; after Serbia had almost doubled her size; and after Turkey had evacuated the Balkans.

Contemporary testimony about the "love of peace" in British policy does not sound so favorable. At any rate, it indicated great tranquillity of mind on his part toward the possibility of war when Grey at that time said to Benckendorff: "In case of a war between Germany and France, England will have to take part in it. If this war should also involve Russia, Austria will be drawn in too. The latter has no wish whatever to mix in this question, but will be compelled by circumstances to do so. . . . It would therefore no longer be a duel between France and Germany—it would be a general war." ⁴⁰ Lloyd George's speech had a sustained influence as an evil that ever begets new evils. According to the "Times," Lloyd George congratulated Paul Cambon at Paris in 1919 as the man who, as architect of the Anglo-French Entente, had made the war. But Cambon declined the honor: "It was your speech of July, 1911, that gave us the certainty that we could count upon England."

The German Army Law of 1913

AMONG the suspicions that Germany, on the occasion of the Agadir Crisis, wished either to give France a diplomatic humiliation or else wanted war, two statements deserve to be stressed.

The first is this: "Had the crisis led to war, this

would have come at the very season that we know was favored for the purpose by German military leaders in 1870, and that was selected for the menace of France in 1905, and that we believe was decided by the military authorities for war in 1914" (p. 231). This naïve "season suspicion," which represents Bismarck, the founder of the German Empire, as the spineless plaything of the Prussian generals,⁴¹ and makes the German General Staff responsible for the time chosen for the murderous deed at Sarajevo, needs no comment.⁴²

The second suspicion is introduced with the question: why, contrary to Germany's intentions, did the crisis end neither in the diplomatic humiliation of France nor in war? And as answer we read: "One answer would be that in 1911 the German Fleet was not so strong as in 1914, nor the German Army at the same height of equipment to which it was subsequently brought by her capital levy" (p. 231). What ignorance of "facts and figures" is revealed in this sentence! That the German Fleet in 1914 was just as unequal to the British Fleet as it had been in 1911 should be known even to non-experts. And upon the land army the Army Law of 1913 had scarcely begun to have any effect. It was not a law "on the offensive" like the law for three-year military service in France, which went into immediate effect, and could hardly be borne for a considerable time. The German Army Law was a "law on the defensive at long range." Until the summer of 1914 only a single increased levy of recruits (that of October, 1913) had been called in. The active army itself would not have derived the full advantage from the 1913 Law before the spring of 1915; and twenty-four years more

would have had to elapse before the entire army could receive the strength provided for in all the yearly classes of the reserves and Landwehr. Such was the case with respect to the army. As regards material equipment, the increased supply of artillery ammunition, proved by the experience gained in the Balkan Wars to be urgently necessary, was not designed to take effect before the end of 1917.

Are all these things really still unknown to the literary assistants of Earl Grey? Has no one among them read the book of the foremost French expert, General Buat, *L'Armée allemande pendant la Guerre de 1914-1918*? If, on the other hand, these things are known, how can it be asserted that the German Army Law of 1913 was planned in anticipation of a war in 1914?

*Haldane's Mission to Berlin in the
Spring of 1912*

GERMAN investigators have been inclined to regard Haldane's mission of February, 1912, as a decisive about-face from the anti-German attitude adopted by the Foreign Office in the previous summer. That conception is now known to have been too optimistic. Grey even now does not know whether the suggestion of sending a British Minister to Berlin for a friendly exchange of views proceeded from an English or from a German source; he cast suspicion upon the proposal at the time as "one of those petty, unofficial manœuvres that could be avowed or disavowed at Berlin," according to the circumstances (p. 241). Sir Arthur Nicolson opposed

the idea and attempted to prevent its execution.⁴³ To this attitude of the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary, so lacking in enthusiasm, there was added the chronic fear that the visit might arouse "suspicion and distrust at Paris" (p. 242). For that reason the French Ambassadors at London and Berlin were immediately reassured that "there was by no means any question of beginning negotiations. . . . The only desire was to learn the wishes of the German Government and obtain information about the German fleet program."⁴⁴ Haldane had scarcely arrived in Berlin when Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, on February 10 made his well-known speech about the German "luxury fleet." As Poincaré betrays, this outburst was a well-considered plan caused by vexation due to the fact that Kiderlen-Wächter had not been called into the negotiations.⁴⁵

These negotiations, which had been begun so reluctantly by England but were nevertheless continued after Haldane's return to London, broke down by reason of the fact that while Germany was willing to go to the limit in renouncing the Fleet Bill, she would do this only in return for a political agreement with England guaranteeing the security of Germany in case of a Continental war. . . .⁴⁶ A statement made by Grey to the German Ambassador on March 17—"A direct neutrality agreement would necessarily wound French sensibilities, a thing that the English Government must avoid"—left little hope indeed of meeting German wishes; nevertheless, the negotiations were not broken off. Then on March 27 an unusual step was taken by the British Ambassador at Paris, Sir Francis Bertie.

He called on Poincaré, begged to be permitted to speak "not as Ambassador," passionately warned him that for France all danger of an Anglo-German agreement had not yet disappeared, and closed with the words: "If you cause strong language to be used in London they will undoubtedly hesitate to commit the mistake which I fear." It is probably a case without parallel that an Ambassador should request a foreign Government "*faites parler avec fermeté*" to his own Government.

On March 28 Poincaré instructed Paul Cambon to make earnest representations: "We have shown confidence in England. Without the two Governments being bound by written treaties we agreed that our General Staff should meet the British Staff and reveal to it our strategic plans. We are just as far as ever from demanding of the British Government that they surrender their freedom of action in our behalf; but it is the least (that we can expect), that England should not use this freedom to our disadvantage through a neutrality declaration which could only serve to egg on Germany to repeat her tactics of provocation toward us."⁴⁷

On March 29 Cambon executed his commission. On the same day Grey gave his definite refusal to the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, who reported under the same date that the British Minister said to him: "Any surpassing whatever of her present Fleet Law by Germany would prevent the British Government from entering into a political agreement with Germany; and a complete abandonment of the German Fleet Law is probably not within the scope of discussion." Thereupon Berlin limited the further exchange of views to colonial questions

What will be Earl Grey's feelings if he should accidentally discover the arbitrary action of Lord Bertie? The arbitrary doings of Russian diplomatists called forth a very sharp judgment from him, as reported above. Historical investigators owe a debt of gratitude to Poincaré for having so thoroughly confirmed Isvolski's dispatch of the autumn of 1912 saying that the British Cabinet had hesitated whether to accept the German offer of a neutrality agreement or not, but that Poincaré's protest had produced the negative decision.⁴⁸

*The Anglo-French Naval Convention and the
Grey-Cambon Correspondence in the
Fall of 1912*

SIR EDWARD permitted the military conversations after 1906 to take their course without concerning himself about the arrangements made. "What they (the military experts) settled I never knew," he wrote to Asquith in April, 1911 (p. 92). The French Cabinet was in a happier position. It knew, at any rate, in the fall of 1911 what the British General Staff had agreed upon with the French.⁴⁹ The Quai d'Orsay was better informed than Downing Street on the military secrets of England.

According to Grey, Asquith during the Agadir Crisis had scruples about this General Staff diplomacy similar to those once felt by Campbell-Bannerman, and about the beginning of September he expressed the opinion that these conversations were "rather dangerous, especially the part which refers to possible British assist-

ance." But the head of the Foreign Office reassured him: "It would create consternation if we forbade our military experts to converse with the French. No doubt these conversations and our speeches⁵⁰ have given an expectation of support. I do not see how that can be helped" (p. 93). The curse that follows an evil deed can, according to this confession, no longer be averted. Gradually other Cabinet members, so we are informed by Grey, learned of these military conversations and demanded that their "non-committal" character be fixed in writing (p. 94). In this way the Grey-Cambon correspondence of the following year was brought about, wherein the wording of Grey's letter received the approval of the entire Cabinet.

Quite a different story is told by Poincaré as to the origin of this correspondence.⁵¹ The chief point in the Anglo-French Naval Convention consisted, as is well-known, in the arrangement that France should withdraw her last (third) squadron also to the Mediterranean, whereas England should do the reverse and withdraw ships from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. France, however, was not willing to agree to this stripping of her north and west coast of protection "without having received a seriously-meant guaranty from England." The French Ambassador was commissioned to extract such a guaranty. He pressed first Nicolson, then Grey. The latter yielded and on his part pressed Asquith, who consented under two conditions: (1) Not diplomatic notes, but a personal exchange of letters between the Secretary and the Ambassador; (2) approval of the wording by the Cabinet.

According to Grey's story, therefore, the correspond-

ence resulting from an English initiative fixed the fact that England was not bound. According to Poincaré's story, on the other hand, the correspondence originated in a French initiative, and it was to form a preliminary condition for the seriously-meant guaranty demanded for the Naval Convention. It may be left to the judgment of the reader to decide which story is the more probable.

Now as to the Naval Convention, it was undoubtedly the most important, in a political sense, of all the strategic agreements made between the two Powers. The exposure of the French north and west coasts took place, and could only take place, in the firm confidence that these coasts would be protected by the British Fleet in case of war—indeed in any war, whatever might be the cause of it. And so Asquith declared to Prince Lichnowsky on August 2, 1914, that a neutral attitude by the British Government was rendered difficult by two things: first, by possible violation of Belgian neutrality, and second, "by a possible attack of German warships upon the wholly unprotected north coast of France, which the French, *in reliance upon British support*, had left unprotected in favor of their Mediterranean Fleet."⁵²

Churchill, too, rightly estimated the effect of the Convention when, during the negotiations about it, he wrote to Grey on August 23, 1912, that England's freedom of action might be seriously endangered "if France can represent to us that she laid bare her Atlantic coast and concentrated her naval forces in the Mediterranean in consequence of the measures agreed to by us"; and when he gave the following judgment upon the agreement made: "Although we recognized the difficulties and

saw clearly that we were *committing ourselves politically*, we insisted upon carrying out the naval measures." 53

Grey himself testifies that Cambon called his attention ⁵⁴ to this correspondence on July 30, 1914, when France was feverishly soliciting England's armed assistance. The French Ambassador would hardly have done this if he had seen in the Convention an express stipulation that England was "not bound." As historian, Grey has a hard struggle to hold his own against Poincaré, Asquith, Churchill, and himself.

The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913

IN this chapter there are some very correct judgments. Thus Grey writes of the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913): "This treaty had in it the seeds of inevitable future trouble. . . . Any future Balkan peace was impossible as long as the Treaty of Bucharest remained. . . . The settlement after the second Balkan War was not one of justice but of force" (p. 253). This is nothing less than approval—unfortunately much belated—of Austria-Hungary's policy, which aimed at strengthening Bulgaria, looted in the worst manner even in Grey's present view, and at reducing the size of Serbia, which had been unduly aggrandized at the cost of Bulgaria.

Grey is equally correct in his judgment of Germany's attitude at the London Conference. "Germany was determined that war should be avoided, and for this purpose she had a whole-hearted representative and agent

in Lichnowsky" (p. 265). And did this Germany, which in 1913 was so peaceably disposed, have as her goal in 1911 either the diplomatic defeat of France or war? And the German generals who so calmly let July and August, 1913, pass—could they have chosen, as Grey claims, this time of the year 1914 to break loose?

The Russian representative at the Conference, Count Benckendorff, did not form an equally favorable judgment of his French colleague Cambon and his superior Poincaré. On February 25, 1913, he wrote to St. Petersburg that France had not, like England, formulated a reservation that her support (of Russia) was to be of a purely diplomatic character. "So far was this from being the case—no mistake must be made on this point—that Cambon, in spite of his wise and moderate (though never enigmatic) attitude at the meetings in reality regulated his conduct wholly in accordance with mine rather than at the bidding of his own intentions. On the contrary, if I recall his conversations with me and the actual words exchanged and connect them with the attitude of Poincaré, the impression, amounting almost to a conviction, forms itself in my mind that among all Powers, France is the only one which, I do not go so far as to say desires war, but would, nevertheless, accept it without great regret. In any case, there has been nothing to show me that France is taking any active part in working for a compromise. Now, a compromise means peace; beyond that compromise lies war." 55

The fact must be recognized that Grey does not repeat the fabrication that Germany agreed in the summer of 1913 to Austria's plan for attacking Serbia, and

that the execution of this plan was only hindered through Italy's objections.⁵⁶

The asserted sequence leading to the Balkan Wars—annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tripoli, Balkan Wars (p. 251)—cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. Italy seized Tripoli not because three years previously Austria-Hungary had transformed into an annexation the occupation and administration of the two Turkish provinces that had been turned over to her at the Berlin Congress upon motion of Lord Salisbury, but because the Government at Rome had in the autumn of 1911 recognized the fact that the French protectorate over Morocco had been established, and therefore feared that France, now in possession of her part of the North-African booty agreed upon in 1901, might no longer concede to Italy the part falling to her. This connection was once clearly set forth by Marquis San Giuliano.⁵⁷ The difference is not unimportant. The first link in the chain of events leading to the World War is to be traced back to French, not to Austrian, initiative. The connection is as follows: Morocco, Tripoli, Balkan Wars, World War.

*Negotiations for an Anglo-Russian
Naval Agreement (1914)*

WHEN Sazonov while visiting King George at Balmoral in September, 1912, met Grey, he followed a suggestion given him by Poincaré in the previous month and threw out a feeler to learn what support at sea Russia might expect if she should become involved in a war with Ger-

many "by her alliance with France" (I, p. 287). Sir Edward expressed objections to operations of the British Fleet in the Baltic and continued: "Of course our Fleet (if it could not get the German Fleet to come out and fight, which was what we should like) would shut up and blockade the German North Sea coast and would, if we went to war, do all it could against Germany and to help whoever was at war with Germany." This part of Grey's record agrees in substance with Sazonov's report, and shows at the same time how far the leading circles in England were from regarding the German Fleet—even after the Navy Bill of the spring of 1912—as a match for the British Fleet.

The Russian Minister, however, reported something else to the Tsar: "In this connection Grey corroborated of his own accord the existence of an agreement between Great Britain and France—as I had already learnt from Poincaré—by which England undertook, in the event of war with Germany, to come to the assistance of France, not only at sea, but also on the continent by landing troops." ⁵⁸ Grey's memoirs admit that the French communication regarding the military conversations might possibly have been made in a form that could give an "impression of some binding effect" (I. p. 276). In Grey's record of this conversation, however, the part of the Russian report just quoted is lacking. On the other hand, Sazonov's report lacks the passage: The question whether England would take part in the war depended upon "how the war came about"; no British Government could go to war unless backed by public opinion, which would never approve a French war of revenge. If Germany, however, should be led

by her "great, I may say, unprecedented strength" to attempt to crush France, the rôle of a passive observer, in Grey's opinion, would not be possible.

As often happened to Poincaré, as happened to Sir Charles Hardinge at Reval, so Grey, too, was misunderstood by the Russians at Balmoral. In his book he explains the discrepancy by alleging that after 1905 he was repeatedly asked whether England, in case of a war with Germany, would fight only at sea or also on land—to which he claims to have answered impatiently that England "would use fleet, army, men, money, and every resource she had" (I, p. 289).

What the Russians did not succeed in obtaining at Balmoral, the French obtained without effort a year and a half later. At the end of April Sir Edward accompanied the royal couple to Paris. On the third and last day of the visit the British Minister was invited to the Quai d'Orsay, where it was explained to him that St. Petersburg had learned of the conversations between the French and British General Staffs; hence, in order not to give offense to the Russians, England should consent to make a naval agreement with them. Grey agreed so quickly that the French believed he was already sure of obtaining the approval of the Cabinet. This was then obtained, on the lines laid down in the Grey-Cambon correspondence of November, 1912 (I, p. 275). As a supplement to the memoirs it must be added that the Secretary of State invited the Ambassadors of France and Russia to his office on May 22, and after handing the British-French correspondence to Count Benckendorff he proposed to him that the Russian Naval At-

taché be empowered to discuss the various questions with the British Admiralty.⁵⁹

Grey never inquired subsequently about the course of these discussions (I, p. 274). But the matter was not kept secret, and on June 11 a question was asked in Parliament whether an Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement had been concluded, or whether any negotiations looking toward the conclusion of such an Agreement were in progress. According to the usual custom, Grey gave an answer that contained nothing untrue, yet concealed the truth. With light irony toward himself he writes that "it does not answer the question put to me." Grey contends that it was necessary to give such an answer. The Prime Minister, he said, treated in the same manner questions regarding the military conversations with France (I, p. 279)—which is perfectly true. The deception of Parliament was discussed with the Russian Ambassador, who reports about it as follows:⁶⁰ "I informed Grey yesterday that Captain Wolkow had returned from St. Petersburg and had been empowered to take up the negotiations with the Admiralty. Grey answered that he would at once inform the First Lord of the Admiralty of this. Upon this occasion Grey remarked that some indiscretions had to his regret occurred in this affair, and that German newspapers at first and others also had later discussed it. He regretted this all the more, as he would have to answer a question on this subject in the House. I answered him that I for my part regretted to the utmost these indiscretions, which occurred too often; I was convinced, I said, that your Excellency shared that view, and I told him that the

"Nowoje Wremja" had published a contradiction. Grey did not know this and was very glad to hear it. He asked me to get the text of it. He then told me in general outlines the answer which he thought of making in Parliament, and which would cover our negotiations as well as those with France. I answered that it seemed to me proper to handle the matter in that way."

In similarly veiled language Grey expressed himself to the German Ambassador on June 24.⁶¹ In a second interview on July 9, he admitted that "from time to time conversations had taken place between the naval and military authorities (British with French and with Russians)"—to which Prince Lichnowsky very correctly remarked that it was "desirable that such military conversations be restricted to a minimum, as they might otherwise lead to undesirable results."⁶² As is known today these conversations proceeded unfortunately far beyond a minimum and had the undesirable results that were justly feared.

The Naval Agreement with Russia, however, did not reach a conclusion. The British Admiralty appears in general to have had little inclination to act, because the reconstruction of the Russian Fleet had not, in its opinion, made sufficient progress.⁶³

Development of the Straits Question (1908-1915)

IN the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis the London Cabinet had turned deaf ears to the Russian proposals.⁶⁴ Grey's memoirs maintain a silence about the "Straits" ques-

tion till the World War. From the reports of Count Benckendorff, however, we know that London had not regarded the suitable moment for realizing the wishes of St. Petersburg as having yet arrived.⁶⁵ Not till the fall of 1911, upon the occasion of the action at Constantinople of the Russian Ambassador Tcharykoff, who sought a sort of Russian protectorate over the shores of the Straits with a territorial guaranty for Turkey and the free passage of Russian war-ships through the Straits,⁶⁶ did Downing Street drop the objection of the "ill-chosen point of time"; nevertheless, it upheld its counter-proposal of 1908 for the opening of the Straits to all nations—in other words, a solution that the English must have known was the least acceptable to the Russians.⁶⁷ When in the first Balkan War, at the beginning of November 1912, the entry of the Bulgarians into Constantinople was to be expected, Grey even proposed to neutralize Salonica and Constantinople and give them an international status.⁶⁸ Upon the basis of a long memorandum by Sazonov, in which objections were raised against this idea so destructive of all Russia's future hopes, Grey gave his consent to Isvolski's plan of 1908, but with the very restrictive clause that an understanding with Turkey must be reached beforehand.⁶⁹

It would certainly have been interesting to learn something about these events from the pen of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs of that time, but even the following admission will probably suffice: "It had always been British policy to keep Russia out of Constantinople and the Straits; we fought for that object in the Crimean War in the fifties, and it was our main policy

under Beaconsfield in the seventies of the nineteenth century; of course it was our policy still." It was only in the World War at the beginning of the Dardanelles Expedition (spring of 1915) after long deliberation, after overcoming serious objections, and after consultations to which the leaders of the Conservative Opposition were invited, that a secret treaty was made; but the reader hears nothing about the contents of this instrument (II, p. 187 ff.).

Considerably more is told about it by the French Ambassador at the Tsar's court.⁷⁰ On November 14, 1914, Sazonov received information that the Government of His Britannic Majesty "had reached the conclusion that the question of the Straits must be settled in accordance with Russia's wishes." As a compensation for this, it was announced from London a few days later that the London Government saw itself "confronted with the necessity (!) of annexing Egypt." Grey continued for some time to interpose difficulties to the carrying out of the King's promise regarding Constantinople, and finally on March 12, 1915, he demanded as a second compensation the annexation of the "neutral Zone" of Persia. Sazonov answered: "Done!" Paléologue noted jubilantly in his diary: "Thus the Persian question, which had nurtured discord between England and Russia for two hundred years, was disposed of in one minute." It may also be added: "thus were the rights of neutral states and weak nations preserved."

It is a common feature of the two stories that it was not until the Great War that British policy, with reluctance yet with very considerable territorial gains for Britain, abandoned its opposition to Russian aspira-

The Proposal of a "Naval Holiday"

tions. The Russian conference of February 21, 1914, accordingly, saw the situation clearly in reaching the conclusion that the possession of the Straits could not be realized through a localized war with Turkey, but only "within the framework of a European war." Hence, it was not only a question of overcoming the resistance of the Central Powers, but also of overcoming the resistance of Great Britain, which—in the case of a companion in arms who had millions of soldiers at his disposal—willingly granted much of what it had stubbornly refused in peace.

The Proposal of a "Naval Holiday" in the Spring of 1914

ONE of Grey's grievances against Germany lies in the fact that Churchill's proposal of a "holiday" in German and English ship-building for the year 1914 was rejected. He is clear-sighted enough to see that no intention of going to war during that year can be deduced from the rejection, for the suspension of shipbuilding would not have diminished the strength of Germany's sea-power at the beginning of the war (I, p. 291). All the more to be wondered at is it that he does not see how little the Army Bill of 1913 justifies such suspicions.

It is easily to be understood that Grey did not know how diverse were the conditions for ship-building in Germany and England. Even in case of a year's holiday England would not have needed to discharge any workmen, as her shipyards worked for the entire world. It was otherwise with Germany, where a pause of a year

would have thrown thousands of workmen out of employment.

It is less to be excused in Grey that his memoirs fail to mention that the proposal of the "naval holiday" also caused great excitement at Paris—there, of course, because of its ostensible friendliness to Germany—so that a speedy visit of Prime Minister Asquith to Paris became necessary in order to soothe troubled minds.⁷¹

*Draft of an Anglo-German Colonial
Agreement (1914)*

GREY's records devote only a few words to the Anglo-German Agreement about the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese Colonies, which in July, 1914, was nearing its conclusion. "We had shown our readiness to meet her [Germany] over the Bagdad Railway, and, as far as we could honorably do so, in the matter of the Portuguese Colonies; and an agreement on those subjects had practically been completed in the early months of 1914" (1, p. 292). Upon this matter he makes the following note: "I felt that the combination of the secret agreement with Germany about Portuguese Colonies with our alliance with Portugal had from the first placed the British Government in an ambiguous position. I therefore told the German Ambassador that we had assured the Portuguese Government that the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance was regarded as still in force; and, to make everything plain, I proposed that this assurance to Portugal should be published as well as the revised form of the agreement with Germany about Portuguese Col-

onies. The latter had been initialled, but I was not prepared to sign it, unless it was to be published. The suggestion was not welcome at Berlin, and the revised agreement about Portuguese Colonies was therefore never completed. This agreement was left as I found it on entering office."

The view must be entirely agreed to that the British Government had placed itself in an "ambiguous position"; for they had concluded an arrangement in 1898 with Germany regarding an eventual liquidation of the Portuguese Colonies,⁷² and immediately thereafter (1899) they recognized—through the Windsor Agreement—as still in force the obligation to guarantee the integrity of Portugal's colonies—an obligation which rested upon the obsolete alliance treaties of 1703. The meaning of the passages quoted from the memoirs is manifestly that this guaranty, which is more than a hundred years older than the forgotten guaranties of the Vienna Congress, was regarded by Grey as more important than the recent agreement with Germany, which lost very much of its importance through such a view. Nevertheless, the ratification and publication of the Agreement, even with this limitation, would have been of great importance. The words of Bismarck sent to Vienna in 1883 before the renewal of the Three-Emperors-Alliance in order to carry through Russia's wishes for changes in the text of the Treaty—"the most important thing is ever that a treaty of this tendency exists at all between the three Powers"⁷³ would have applied *cum grano salis* also to this Treaty, inasmuch as the French and Russian war party would have found their confidence in England's armed help dampened.

Anglo-German relations had decidedly improved in general—we can also agree with Grey—as a consequence of the common work for peace at the London Conference and on the Agreement under negotiations. Precisely this changed atmosphere misled Berlin after the outbreak of the great crisis to hope, not indeed that England would remain neutral in a European war,⁷⁴ but that it would not hinder Austria in calling Serbia to account, and that it would preserve the peace by exercising a moderating influence at Paris and St. Petersburg.

Two incidents, however, which became known through the papers of the American Colonel House and the American Ambassador Page, show that this betterment of relations, so far as England is concerned, was overestimated at Berlin. House, who was sent by Wilson to Berlin, Paris, and London on a mission of information, had left the capital of Germany about the beginning of June “made happy by the confidence that the great influence of the German Emperor would be used in favor of peace and the expansion of the world’s commerce.” In London, therefore, he suggested that Grey should go to the Kiel Week. Nevertheless, the British Foreign Secretary, who had just been in Paris and had surprised the French with his ready acceptance of their proposals, refused with the explanation that such a visit would cause vexation in Paris and St. Petersburg. And not only did Grey himself not wish to set foot upon German soil, but he persuaded House also to abandon his second visit to Berlin. A meeting which the German Foreign Secretary von Jagow had arranged, in the spring of 1914, with Sir William Tyrrell, Grey’s private Secre-

tary, and which the British Minister at first had approved, likewise did not take place. In the presence of such fear of French susceptibilities can anybody still speak of any serious and energetic desire not only of reaching better relations with Germany, but even good relations?

PART TWO

The Crisis of July-August, 1914

*The British Documents on the Origin
of the War*

THE 677 documents of this new collection disclose many important facts which had been skilfully suppressed in the British Blue Book of 1914, and only a few of which had since then become known through other publications. Not only are the official notes printed but also about 30 private letters which, according to the introduction by the editor, Mr. Headlam-Morley, historical adviser of the Foreign Office, were regarded as "essential" to the work of British diplomacy. Very convenient, furthermore, is the addition of many—though not all—marginal remarks of the higher officials of the London Foreign Office, since they afford a remarkably interesting insight into the influence that shaped the decisions of Sir Edward Grey, the head of the Foreign Office.

The much-discussed marginal notes of Emperor William in the German documents are most impulsive thoughts put upon paper informally at the moment. In not a few cases he was led by his advisers to a different view; and sometimes during the crisis his marginal notes reached the Wilhelmstrasse so late that the matters referred to had already been acted upon. The notes of Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir Arthur Nicolson, and Assistant Under-Secretary, Sir Eyre Crowe, on the other hand, represent carefully considered counsel

for their chief. He was not bound by such counsels of course and by no means always followed them; nevertheless, he was certainly strongly influenced by them, and all the more so as he was in harmony with their leading thoughts—as is seen from his memoirs—and only diverged from the views of his advisers in regard to methods, and not in regard to the ultimate goal.

A full guaranty that the selection of the documents has been made with editorial competence, is given by the personality of Headlam-Morley. Moreover, general confidence is increased by the verification of the collection by the two eminent historians, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, who, however, undertake no guaranty for the remarks attached by Headlam-Morley to a few of the documents—a procedure that differs from that observed with the *German Documents on the Outbreak of the War*.

It is not possible, within the limits of a brief work, to mention all the important points at which our knowledge of the pre-history of the great catastrophe has been enriched by the British Documents. Moreover, mistakes are scarcely avoidable in a first working-over of such copious material, and readers are asked to coöperate in the correction of these. Under these reservations attention will be called in the following pages to some of the particularly important incidents.

The "Feeler" by Vienna of July 16

THE British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, had, on July 9, reported on the bitterness prevailing in

all circles of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy¹ (No. 40). On the 16th he was able to announce that the former Royal and Imperial Ambassador at Rome, Count Lützow, had had a long conversation on the previous day with Count Berchtold and Count Forgach, who gave him the following information about the intentions of the Vienna Cabinet (Nos. 50 and 56): indictment of Serbia for complicity in the assassination; demand for effective measures for suppression of nationalist and anarchist propaganda; no long negotiations, but demand for immediate acquiescence by Serbia; otherwise, force would be used. Germany was represented as in full agreement; all Europe would sympathize with Austria-Hungary in demanding that Serbia adopt in future a more submissive attitude. Even Russia would not wish to protect assassins though of Slav race. But in any case the Monarchy would go ahead regardless of results, for she would lose her position as a Great Power if she stood any further nonsense from Serbia.

On the same day (July 16) Count Trautmannsdorff of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at London visited Sir Eyre Crowe and gave expression to very much the same views (No. 50, footnote).

It was clear that Lützow and Trautmannsdorff were not carelessly telling tales out of school, but, in accordance with instructions, wanted to throw out a feeler as to what attitude the London Cabinet might take toward the action against Serbia decided upon at Vienna. If the statesmen on the Thames regarded the foreshadowed action against Serbia as a threat to the peace of the

world, an opportunity was thus offered for an informal and friendly warning, whether directly or through Berlin as the intermediary. Instead of that, the Westminster Gazette, which enjoyed close relations with the British Prime Minister, printed on the following day (July 17) an article which censured the tone of the Serbian press, mentioned the apprehensions entertained at Vienna regarding the Greater-Serbian agitation directed against the integrity of the Danubian Monarchy, and then went on: "In such circumstances the (Austro-Hungarian) Government cannot be expected to remain inactive; and Serbia will be well-advised if she realizes the reasonableness of her great neighbor's anxiety and does whatever may be in her power to allay it, without waiting for a pressure, which might involve what Count Tisza calls 'warlike complications.' "

This article was regarded at St. Petersburg as an encouragement to take severe action against Serbia (No. 58). Must it not also have been so regarded in Vienna? Could it not be looked upon there precisely as an affirmative answer to the feeler thrown out on July 16? ²

At any rate when Grey four days later (July 20) said to the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, that he had recently heard from Vienna merely that Count Berchtold had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was "grave," but admitted that it "should be cleared up," it is difficult to reconcile his words with the information received on July 16th (Nos. 68 and 59). Neither is it compatible with these remarks that the Secretary of State spoke a day later (July 21) with

Direct Conversations between Austria and Russia

the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, of the "great apprehension felt as to what Austria was going to demand of Serbia" (No. 72).³

Direct Conversations between Austria and Russia

As was already known from the book by Professor Oman,⁴ Grey suggested on July 20 in a letter to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, direct conversations between Austria and Russia if matters became tense (No. 67). It is a noteworthy fact that Buchanan first spoke about this matter with the President of the French Republic, then in St. Petersburg; and it is equally noteworthy that the latter declared such conversation *à deux* to be very "dangerous," and proposed instead that France and England should "counsel moderation" at Vienna (No. 76). The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who was later consulted, even thought of a step to be taken by the three Entente Powers, which would have been an imitation of the *démarche* of 1875 planned against Berlin by Gortschakoff upon French instigation and frustrated by Bismarck. The Franco-Russian view made known at London on July 22 was regarded even in the Foreign Office as inexpedient, and Grey mentioned his proposal of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, on July 22 and to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23 (Nos. 79 and 86).⁵

The well-known fact that the direct conversations,

Vienna-St. Petersburg, were actually begun later on upon a German proposal, and that Grey set aside his proposal of a conference in favor of this procedure, shows clearly how closely the German and the English view as to the most expedient method of intervention originally coincided, and how far removed they were from that of Poincaré. Even Nicolson as late as July 28 looked upon such conversations as the best method (No. 239).

The First Thrust of Sir Eyre Crowe

ON July 22 the British Chargé d’Affaires at Berlin reported that Secretary of State von Jagow told him that the attitude of the German Government was clearly described in the semi-official declaration in the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of July 19.⁶ The matter was one that concerned Austria and Serbia alone; and for that reason he (Jagow) did not regard it as opportune to say anything to the Austrian Government. On the other hand, he had repeatedly impressed upon the Serbian representative at Berlin the necessity of putting Serbia’s relations with Austria-Hungary on a proper footing. To the objection of the Serbian diplomatist that his Government had no control over the Serbian press, which was free to publish what it liked, the Secretary of State observed that if a person would or could do nothing to put a stop to a nuisance, that complainant must take the remedy into his own hands (No. 77, repeated in No. 158).⁷

Under this dispatch Crowe wrote:

The First Thrust of Sir Eyre Crowe

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the German Government. On the face of it, it does not bear the stamp of straightforwardness. If they really are anxious to see Austria kept reasonably in check, they are in the best position to speak at Vienna. All they are doing is to inflame the passions at Belgrade and it looks very much like egging on the Austrians when they openly and persistently threaten the Serbian Government through their official newspapers.

It may be presumed that the German Government do not believe that there is any real danger of war. They appear to rely on the British Government to reinforce the German and Austrian threats at Belgrade; it is clear that if the British Government did intervene in this sense, or by addressing admonitions to St. Petersburg, the much desired breach between England and Russia would be brought one step nearer realisation.

But I admit that all this is speculation. We do not know the facts. The German Government clearly do know. They know what the Austrian Government is going to demand, they are aware that those demands will raise a grave issue, and I think we may say with some assurance that they have expressed approval of those demands and promised support, should dangerous complications ensue. So much can, I think, be read in the present telegram.

Prince Lichnowsky's vague hints and apprehensions do not quite correspond to the actual situation which his Government is helping to create.

But both in the utterance of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and in the conversation of Jagow with the British Chargé d'Affaires the German standpoint was expressed with complete frankness; localization of the dispute, which represented a purely Austro-Serbian affair. It is, accordingly, not clear what Crowe refers to in speaking of a lack of straightforwardness in the German attitude. Moreover, as to his remark about the

Serbian press, Sir M. de Bunsen had also reported from Vienna on July 3 on that subject as follows: "I must say I think the Serbian press is behaving shamefully" (No. 29). The Communiqué of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of July 19 was not more sharply, but more mildly, worded than that of the *Westminster Gazette* of the 17th. That it was by no means felt in Belgrade that there was any "egging on" by Germany, is proved by the dispatch of the British Chargé d'Affaires there of the 19th, according to which the Serbian Government claimed to have certain knowledge that "restraint would be exercised on Austria from Berlin" (No. 61). Crowe, however, was unwilling to place any confidence in this statement, as is evident from his remark upon its repetition (No. 80). But so long as this was believed at Belgrade, there was no justification for Crowe's assertion that the Serbian Government was "persistently threatened" by Germany.⁸

The Franco-Russian Declaration of Solidarity

THE index to the British *Blue Book* of 1914 revealed that in Buchanan's telegram regarding the conversation which Sazonov had had with him and the French Ambassador, Paléologue, on July 24th after the publication of the Austrian ultimatum (BB 6), the report concerning the results of Poincaré's visit was suppressed. As became known two years ago, this remarkably important paragraph, which was concealed from the world for ten years, ran as follows (No. 101):

Franco-Russian Declaration of Solidarity

Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador told me confidentially that result of the visit of the President of the French Republic had been to establish the following points:—

1. Perfect community of views on the various problems with which the Powers are confronted as regards the maintenance of general peace and balance of power in Europe, more especially in the East.
2. Decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanations or any summons equivalent to an intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia which the latter would be justified in regarding as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.
3. Solemn affirmation of the obligations imposed by the alliance of the two countries.

That assurance had been given before full knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum was available. If the conversations of July 5 at Potsdam are characterized as a German blank check for Austria, then Poincaré's promise here to Russia must with equal justice be regarded as a blank check for Russia.

The following paragraphs of Buchanan's dispatch about the oral confirmation of France-Russian solidarity, the renewed promise of fulfillment of all duties as an ally, and the demand of Sazonov and Paléologue that England join in this declaration, were correctly reproduced in the *Blue Book* of 1914. These points, however, necessarily made a false impression through the suppression of the previous paragraph, by giving the impression that they had been caused by the Austrian ultimatum. The final paragraph stating that towards the end of the conversation the Rumanian Minister also

joined them was also suppressed. Sazonov urged the latter that the Bucharest Government also make representations at Vienna.

Crowe's Attack of July 25

ON July 24 the Austrian ultimatum and the German note supporting the demands of the Monarchy became known in London. Under the German note (No. 100) the following moderate remarks were written by Crowe on the 25th:

The answer is that owing to the extreme nature of the Austrian demands and the time limit imposed, the localization of the conflict has been made exceedingly difficult. Because the Austrian terms bear on their face the character of a design to provoke a war. The statements made by Austria and now reasserted by Germany concerning Serbia's misdeeds rest for the present on no evidence that is available for the Powers whom the Austrian Government has invited to accept these statements. Time ought to be given to allow the Powers to satisfy themselves as to the facts which they are asked to endorse.

The supplementary remarks of Nicolson and Grey are brief. Sir Arthur mentions only the rumor that Germany had drawn back from Austria; Sir Edward that in his conversation with Lichnowsky he had assumed that a war between Austria and Serbia could not be localized.

Of a tenor quite different from his remarks upon the German note are Crowe's comments upon the next document, Buchanan's report of July 24 (No. 101) an-

nouncing the Franco-Russian declaration of solidarity already mentioned above. Buchanan's report had been received at 8 P. M. on the 24th, but, like the German note also, it was not read till the following day.⁹ Crowe's remarks make a formal memorandum; they must be quoted in extenso:

The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia.

It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Serbia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretexts, and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged.

I think it would be impolitic, not to say dangerous, for England to attempt to controvert this opinion, or to endeavour to obscure the plain issue, by any representation at St. Petersburg and Paris.

The point that matters is whether Germany is or is not absolutely determined to have this war now.

There is still the chance that she can be made to hesitate, if she can be induced to apprehend that the war will find England by the side of France and Russia.

I can suggest only one effective way of bringing this home to the German Government without absolutely committing us definitely at this stage. If, the moment either Austria or Russia begin to mobilize, His Majesty's Government give orders to put our whole fleet on an immediate war footing, this may conceivably make Germany realize the seriousness of the danger to which she would be exposed if England took part in the war.

It would be right, supposing this decision could be taken now, to inform the French and Russian Governments of it, and this again would be the best thing we could do to prevent a very grave situation arising as between England and Russia.

It is difficult not to agree with M. Sazonov that sooner or later England will be dragged into the war if it does come. We shall gain nothing by not making up our minds what we can do in circumstances that may arise to-morrow.

Should the war come, and England stand aside, one of two things must happen:—

(a) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France and humiliate Russia. With the French fleet gone, Germany in occupation of the Channel, with the willing or unwilling coöperation of Holland and Belgium, what will be the position of a friendless England?

(b) Or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?

Our interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is not for the possession of Serbia, but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe and the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom. If we can help to avoid the conflict by showing our naval strength, ready to be instantly used, it would be wrong not to make the effort.

Whatever therefore our ultimate decision, I consider we should decide now to mobilize the fleet as soon as any other Great Power mobilizes, and that we should announce this decision without delay to the French and Russian Governments.

If one will compare this fanfare with his relatively calm considerations upon the German note, one will see with perfect clarity that it was not the Austrian ultimatum and not Germany's support of the Austrian position that tipped the scales with Crowe, but what he had correctly read into Buchanan's report—namely, the resolution of France and Russia to make out of the

Austro-Serbian question a trial of strength between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. The memorandum was written on the morning of July 25, before even the answer of Serbia to the Austrian note was known, and before the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Vienna and Belgrade had taken place. For Crowe the Franco-Russian decision which, according to his view, should automatically lead to the decision of England to fight on the side of France and Russia in case the war broke out, sufficed. Indifferent as to which side was right and which was wrong, indifferent as to whether Austria's complaints against Serbia were justified or not, indifferent as to whether Austria or Russia should first mobilize. Even the slogan for the great trial at arms was here given out: "On that side Germany aiming at a dictatorship in Europe, on this side the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom." Such was to be the *leitmotiv* of the Entente's war-propaganda, and such verbally was to be the ultimatum of June 16, 1919.

Nicolson agreed with the memorandum:

The points raised by Sir Eyre Crowe merit serious consideration, and doubtless the Cabinet will review the situation. Our attitude during the crisis will be regarded by Russia as a test and we must be most careful not to alienate her.

Grey contented himself by adding: "Mr. Churchill told me today that the fleet can be mobilized in twenty-four hours, but I think it premature to make any statement to France and Russia yet."

England's Dependence upon Russia

IN Crowe's considerations his suspicions of Germany occupy the foreground, but next to that stands—apart from his not surprising solicitude for France—an almost greater solicitude for Russia. The decision about the fleet was intended to prevent the “beginning of a most serious situation” with the great Slavic Empire. This aspect of the case is emphasized still more strongly by Nicolson, who, during his four years of service as Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had evidently become an enthusiastic supporter of Tsardom. The attitude of England during the present crisis is to be “the test” for Russia; hence, do not “alienate” Russia from us!

The Introduction to the documents, by Headlam-Morley, supplies an explanation of why the Liberal Government of Great Britain felt itself so strongly attracted to absolutist Russia. Between the two Powers great difficulties had arisen in Asia. In St. Petersburg, people envied the English the great profits that they were making out of the oil-fields of Mesopotamia. In London, people complained of the advance of the Russians in Persia and of Russian relations with Afghanistan. In addition to this was the anxiety about a renewal of the former Russo-German friendship—an object which the pro-German elements at the Tsar's court and in the Russian army might probably realize in view of the more and more threatening prospect of the Russian revolution. For this reason it was sought in Downing Street and on the Neva to bring about a better understanding on open questions; and these efforts had ad-

vanced so far by July 22, 1914, that both parties were agreed in principle to strive for a tripartite guaranty by England, Russia, and Japan of their respective possessions. At the same time were proceeding the conversations already mentioned in Part I, about an Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement, which the Tsar had again suggested at the beginning of April (No. 125, supplement), and to which Grey had allowed himself to be won over during the visit of the King and Queen to Paris in May, and which he later denied in Parliament on June 11, precisely the day on which the negotiations were formally to begin.

From the foregoing it is seen that while Berlin at that time believed that the improvement of Anglo-German relations which had begun during the last Balkan crisis would result in England exercising a moderating influence upon Russia, negotiations were in progress between those two Powers which, on the contrary, caused England to treat Russia's wishes with quite special consideration.

Mobilization of the British Fleet

THE proposal of Crowe to mobilize the British Fleet contains a logical fallacy. Such a mobilization might on the one hand overawe Germany; but on the other it might encourage France and Russia. If now the purpose ostensibly intended by Crowe—to overawe Germany—was to be attained, it would evidently have been necessary in the first instance to inform that Power of the proposed action. Crowe, however, proposed the opposite course; not Germany, but France and Russia

should immediately learn that the British sea-power was to be put upon a full war footing as soon as Austria or Russia mobilized. To give this information to France and Russia might actually have driven Paris and St. Petersburg forward, but never could have checked Germany.

Lord Bertie understood this fact perfectly. In his private communication to Sir Edward Grey on July 30th, he made the following statement (No. 320):—

The French instead of putting pressure on the Russian government to moderate their zeal expect us to give the Germans to understand that we mean fighting if war break out. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France would follow in her wake.

On July 25 Grey was not yet inclined to adopt Crowe's plan. Nevertheless, the "Near-Government," the Navy, lent a helping hand. On the following day, July 26, that fateful Sunday on which Nicolson laid the conference proposal before the world,¹⁰ the First Sea-Lord, Prince Louis Battenberg, upon the announcement of the breaking-off of relations between Vienna and Belgrade, and in accordance with an understanding with Churchill, the chief of the Admiralty, gave orders upon his own initiative that the Fleet, which had been assembled since July 15 for a trial mobilization, should not be demobilized. Churchill, hastening home from the country, approved of this order and told Grey about it that evening upon the latter's return to London. Sir Edward, too, was now satisfied with this step; and he also agreed to its publication, which occurred on

the following morning (July 27), without the Cabinet having been previously informed.¹¹

What Crowe had proposed on the 25th and Grey had rejected was done on the 26th by the Admiralty upon its own initiative, and Grey approved it. Owing to the swiftness of the decision, there could be no question of giving previous information to France and Russia. It was, however, wholly in the spirit of Crowe's proposal that, first of all, Russia's attention was called on July 27 to the significance of this step in an official telegram of Grey's (No. 177) and this was done still more plainly on the 28th in a private letter of Nicolson's (No. 239). It is easily understood why the French Ambassador expressed great satisfaction over the newspaper notice (No. 238).¹² Grey also spoke to the Austrian Ambassador about it (No. 188), but not to the German Ambassador. The incident was in general little noticed in Germany; the first reports from the Naval Attaché at London did not go to the core of the matter (G 174 & 207). Whatever may have been the real intention in mobilizing the Fleet—or more correctly, in not demobilizing it at the time called for—the result was, as reported especially by the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Times*, a very strong stimulation to the war party at St. Petersburg.

*Encouragement of Russia by Grey and
Nicolson*

EVEN before the mobilization of the Fleet, Grey took a step that amounted to a still more dangerous en-

couragement of Russia to take the warpath. Benckendorff did not agree to the English proposal of mediation by the four Powers¹³ and urged Grey to give Germany an intimation that England would not stand aside if a war came. The Foreign Secretary, as he at once informed Buchanan in a confidential letter (No. 132),¹⁴ answered:—

I said that I had given no indication that we should stand aside; on the contrary, I had said to the German Ambassador that, as long as there was only a dispute between Austria and Serbia alone, I did not feel entitled to intervene; but that, directly it was a matter between Austria and Russia, it became a question of the peace of Europe, which concerned us all. I had furthermore spoken on the assumption that Russia would mobilize, whereas the assumption of the German Government had hitherto been, officially, that Serbia would receive no support; and what I had said must influence the German Government to take the matter seriously. In effect, I was asking that, if Russia mobilized against Austria, the German Government, who had been supporting the Austrian demands on Serbia, should ask Austria to consider some modification of her demands under the threat of Russian mobilization. This was not an easy thing for Germany to do, even though we would join at the same time in asking Russia to suspend action. I was afraid, too, that Germany would reply that mobilization with her was a question of hours, whereas with Russia it was a question of days; and that, as a matter of fact, I had asked that if Russia mobilized against Austria, Germany, instead of mobilizing against Russia, should suspend mobilization and join with us in intervention with Austria, thereby throwing away the advantage of time, for, if the diplomatic intervention failed, Russia would meanwhile have gained time for her mobilization. It was true that I had not said anything directly as to whether we would take any part or not if there was a Euro-

pean conflict, and I could not say so; but there was absolutely nothing for Russia to complain of in the suggestion that I had made to the German Government, and I was only afraid that there might be difficulty in its acceptance by the German Government. I had made it on my own responsibility, and I had no doubt it was the best proposal to make in the interests of peace.

But that is obviously equivalent to saying to the Russians: "In contrast to Germany Russia, in my opinion, will mobilize to support Serbia against Austria; in spite of that I have asked the German Government that it should in that event desist from mobilizing. In that way—if the four-Powers' intervention proposed by me should fail—Germany would have lost the advantage of more rapid mobilization, and Russia would have gained time for hers."

And this was said to the Russians before the Serbian answer was known, before the relations between Austria and Serbia were broken off. Benckendorff did not fail to understand Grey correctly, for he telegraphed to his Government on the same day:

"Grey said to the German Ambassador that in his opinion the Austrian mobilization would necessarily be followed by the Russian mobilization; then there would arise the great danger of a general war, and he saw only one hope for a peaceable solution, namely, that Germany, France, Italy, and England abstain from an immediate mobilization in view of the mobilization by Austria and Russia, and for the present tender good offices. Grey said to me that this plan demands above all the agreement of Germany and that Germany obligate herself not to mobilize. In reference to this matter he had first turned to Berlin with a question about it." ¹⁵

Contrary to Grey's expectation, Germany at once accepted the four-Powers' mediation (No. 122, paragraph 2; No. 145, last paragraph; No. 176; No. 190, last paragraph; No. 218, next to last paragraph). Contrary to Grey's expectation again, Germany, on July 27, even promised not to mobilize if Russia mobilized only against Austria (No. 185) and thereby renounced the advantage of a more rapid mobilization.

Grey hastened to send this news to all British Embassies and to the Legation at Nisch, on July 27 (No. 185). The Russian Government could therefore be sure that England would interpose no objection, if they carried out their decision to transform the "period of war-preparation" ordered on the 26th into a full mobilization against Austria; they also could be sure that Germany would adopt no counter-measures.¹⁶

On top of all this, Nicolson wrote on July 28 a private letter to Buchanan (No. 239), which would inevitably strengthen Russia's hopes still further. Along with a review of the course of the crisis hitherto and some vicious attacks upon Germany he wrote:

I can quite understand Russia not being able to permit Austria to crush Serbia. I think the talk about localizing the war merely means that all the Powers are to hold the ring while Austria quietly strangles Serbia. This to my mind is quite preposterous, not to say iniquitous. . . .

What has preoccupied, and I confess has troubled, me very much, is satisfying Russia's very natural request as to what we should do in certain eventualities. I foresaw as well as you did that this crisis might be taken by Russia as a test of our friendship, and that were we to disappoint her all hope of a friendly and permanent understanding with her would disappear. We, of

course, living under such conditions as we do here, when no Government practically can take any decided line without feeling that public opinion amply supports them, are unable to give any decided engagements as to what we should or should not do in any future emergencies; but I think we have made it perfectly clear that in any case neither Germany nor Austria could possibly rely with any certainty upon our remaining neutral, and I think this fact has been much impressed upon them by one or two incidents which have occurred within the last two or three days. The decision to keep our battle fleet together instead of allowing it to disperse in order to give leave to its crews was officially notified and given prominence in the papers, and has been immediately taken as a sign by Germany and others that we are prepared to take our share in hostilities if circumstances arose to make it necessary for us to do so. Moreover you will see that the tone of our press, after the first shock which was occasioned by the Austrian ultimatum, has come round to the fact that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to stand outside a general European conflagration. There is no doubt whatsoever that were we drawn into this conflagration we should be on the side of our friends. Although therefore we were unable to give Sazonof a definite undertaking as to what our attitude would be, I think you will see that there is very little doubt, supposing we were called upon to take a share, that we should not hesitate to do our duty. . . .

Headlam-Morley says in his introduction that the private letters of the Under-Secretary of State "give no instructions, nor indeed suggestions"; their chief purpose was to keep the British Embassies and Legations "in touch with the thought and opinion at home." Buchanan was accordingly now informed as to the prevailing opinion at home, i. e., in the Foreign Office. England, as appeared from Nicolson's letter, had not

yet been able, merely out of consideration for public opinion, to declare openly that she would fight on the side of Russia and France if the war came. This encouragement was given, apparently, even before Austria's declaration of war upon Serbia.¹⁷

Grey's letter of July 25 arrived in time to make it easy for the Russians to carry out the mobilization against Austria. Nicolson's letter of July 28, according to information supplied by Professor Headlam-Morley, arrived in St. Petersburg on August 1, at noon. It therefore could not influence the fatal decision of general mobilization, but it may have contributed to induce Sir G. Buchanan to delay unduly the execution of the telegraphic order received the same day at 5 P. M. "to apply at once for an audience with the Tsar" for transmitting a personal appeal from King George to stop the Russian mobilization (No. 384).

*Was the Localization of the_ Austro-Serbian
War Impossible?*

It has already been pointed out in other places that the belief in the possibility of localizing the Austro-Serbian war was by no means an idea entertained only at Berlin and Vienna. Further proof of this is found in the British documents—proof that was wholly suppressed in the *Blue Book* of 1914—showing that many intelligent British and French diplomatists shared that opinion, inasmuch as they saw in Serbia the party responsible for the conflict and in Russia the party responsible for widening it.

Bunsen's report of July 3 mentioning the "shameful" behavior of the Serbian press (No. 29) has already been mentioned. On July 20 he sent several pieces of news about the persons involved in the assassination and about the Serbian secret societies (No. 64). On the 29th he telegraphed (No. 265):

French Ambassador is reporting to French Government that he is convinced by admissions of Serbian Minister, with whom he was in close contact till Minister departed 26th July, that growing condition of unrest in Southern Slav provinces of Dual Monarchy was such that Austro-Hungarian Government were compelled either to acquiesce in separation of those provinces or make a desperate effort to retain them by reducing Serbia to impotency. Serbian Minister always said that time was working for Serbia, and he told French Ambassador that within three years Southern Slav provinces would be ready to rise against Austria-Hungary without Serbia having to raise her little finger. Austria-Hungary realizes she could wait no longer, and determined on war, from which it looks as if nothing would now deter her. French Ambassador thinks this shows that conflict is not due to German instigation and that it does not necessarily show that Germany desires European war, as is thought by many in France.

On July 21 a report (No. 70) from the British Consul-General at Budapest was received, in which, after describing the unpopularity of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand with the Magyars and his preference for the non-Magyar nationalities, he mentioned the rumors that the heir-apparent "had leanings toward Trialism and was in favor of establishing a Southern Slav Kingdom as a third component part of the Hapsburg Monarchy." Then he went on:

How far these reports were true it is not now necessary to inquire, and it may be taken for granted that once on the throne he would have had to modify his views and yield to the force of circumstances. There can, however, be no doubt as to the sympathetic interest which he took in the aspirations of the various nationalities, and great hopes were founded on his succession both among the Southern Slavs and the Roumanians of Transylvania. This fact renders the crime of Serajevo all the more senseless. It is surely the irony of fate that the future ruler who was commonly regarded as a champion of Southern Slav rights should have fallen a victim of the criminal propaganda of Pan-Serbian agitation.

Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador at Paris, opposed with special emphasis the intervention of Russia—as was already partly known from his Memoirs—but at the same time, owing to the conciliatory attitude of Bienvenu-Martin, acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was led into the error of believing that the actual French Government, absent till July 29 from Paris on the home-voyage from St. Petersburg, was also opposed to the Russian demands. On July 25 he reported officially (No. 129):

I expressed to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the opinion that in democratic countries such as England and France war could not be made without support of public opinion, and I felt sure that public opinion in England would not sanction a war in support of Russia if she, as protector of Slavs, picked a quarrel with Austria over Austro-Serbian difficulty. He admitted, but not as Minister, that it would be difficult to bring French public opinion to fighting point in such a case as the present one.

Was Localization of War Impossible?

In support of his views—probably to make sure that his report should come under Grey's eyes without adverse comment—he wrote at the same time a private letter to him (No. 134):

I do not think that if Russia picked a quarrel with Austria over the Austro-Servian difficulty public opinion in France would be in favor of backing up Russia in so bad a cause.

Consequently the French Government will probably advise the Russian Government to moderate any excessive zeal that they may be inclined to display to protect their Serbian client.

Bertie was so disquieted by the course that British policy appeared to have taken, that again on July 27, for the sake of precaution privately, he raised a warning voice (No. 192):

I am sure that the French Government do not want to fight and they should be encouraged to put pressure on the Russian Government not to assume the absurd and obsolete attitude of Russia being the protectress of all Slav States whatever their conduct, for this will lead to war.

I do not believe that the German Emperor and Government were accessories before the fact to the terms of the Austrian note. If they had been the Emperor would not have been away yachting.

The demonstrations in the streets here are nothing compared with those at Berlin where the attitude of the populace is not reassuring.

Isvolski is expected back here today or tomorrow and he is not an element of peace.

If you get together meetings between yourself and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors call them consultations, for the Austrians would resent a sort of repetition of the London re-

British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey

unions which ended in being dubbed the London Conference. They would consider that they were being treated as a Balkan Minor State.

The Quai d'Orsay represented by M. Berthelot is not sufficiently *coulant* with the German Ambassador. It might well have consented to announce in the press as suggested by him that his *démarches* had been very friendly and that some mention should be made of *solidarité*.

As far as concerns the press notice mentioned here by Bertie, he had even suggested in his official telegram that London should urge the French Government to meet the justifiable wish of the German Ambassador (No. 184). He got in return only sarcastic marginal notes from Crowe and Nicolson repudiating his suggestion. Sir Francis Bertie really appears to have had good reasons for writing so often privately and directly to Grey; but in 1914 the world heard just as little about his private letters as about his official warnings.

The Ambassador also followed attentively the outbreak of a nationalistic campaign in the Paris press, which was inaugurated by the *Echo de Paris* (No. 123, July 25), and was then taken up by the *Temps* and Clemenceau's *L'Homme Libre* (No. 193, July 27). The British Embassy also reported hostile demonstrations before the Austrian Embassy, ostensibly made by Serbians and Czechs.

On the 28th the Ambassador reported how Isvolski had expressed himself on the previous evening, after having just returned to his post (No. 216). The war, he said, was "inevitable," and that it was England's fault because she did not immediately declare her solidarity with Russia and France. An Austrian promise to

respect the integrity of Serbia, he said, would be useless if Serbia were reduced to a state of vassalage; and Austria's object was to extend Germanic influence and power toward Constantinople, a thing that Russia could not possibly permit. To allow Austria a free hand with Serbia, he continued, would be as deep a humiliation for Russia as that which he himself had had to accept in 1909; "Russia was not then in a position to fight, but things are very different now." Thus spoke Isvolski on the evening of July 27, before the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia.

Bertie's anxiety again found expression in a private letter to his chief (No. 244), according to which he had inquired of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs whether Isvolski had used similar language to him, "for if it represented the view of his Government and he had just come from St. Petersburg it was not promising for the preservation of peace."

Had Grey forgotten all these warnings—suppressed in the *Blue Book*—when, in his *Twenty-five Years* (II, p. 276), he was only able to say of Isvolski that he had indulged in "vain and empty boasting" when he declared in Paris: "C'est ma guerre"?

The growth of a warlike temper after Poincaré's return did not escape Bertie (No. 270), and on the following day he saw through French tactics. In a private letter to Grey (No. 320a) he spoke for the first time of the urgency of the French for an English declaration of solidarity, and then continued:

The French instead of putting pressure on the Russian Government to moderate their zeal expect us to give the Germans to understand that we mean fighting if war break out. If we gave

British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey

an assurance of armed assistance to France and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France would follow in her wake.

After a statement about movements of troops in the East of France, he said further:

The newspapers but not yet the people are becoming bellicose.

Like Bertie, the British Minister at Berne was also a supporter of the localization of the conflict and reported similarly from the Swiss press in spite of its fundamental sympathy with small nations in their quarrels with Great Powers (No. 324).

The English press, too, by no means had any enthusiasm for Serbia for a long time after the assassination. On July 25 Sazonov complained that, with the exception of the *Times*, nearly the whole of the English press was on the side of Austria (No. 125).

Russia and Serbia

It appears that the last word has not yet been spoken on the question whether and how far Russia, by promising support to Serbia, had encouraged her not to yield fully to the Austrian demands. As early as July 18 Grouitch, General Secretary of the Belgrade Foreign Office, said to the British Chargé d'Affaires that Serbia, in case of an Austrian attack, "would not stand alone; Russia would not stand by and see Serbia wantonly attacked" (No. 61 and 80). On July 28 Grouitch informed the British representative that Russian support was "assured," an ambiguous word than can mean both

“certain” and “promised” (No. 221).¹⁸ Headlam-Morley’s view (Introduction, p. XII) that these repeated communications represented neither an official nor an unofficial intimation that there was any kind of definite agreement between Russia and Serbia, but were only a personal interpretation of the situation as seen by Grouitch, may be correct, but it is more likely to be wrong.

*Pinpricks against Germany in the
Marginal Notes*

How Crowe and Nicolson tried to influence their chief against Germany can be shown by merely citing two instances:

1. On July 25 Grey received a forecast of the probable contents of Serbia’s answer—not yet exactly known—and had it forwarded to Berlin with the added wish that the German Government, if the Serbian answer should actually correspond with the forecast, “may feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of it” (No. 115). Berlin at once sent this suggestion on to Vienna, thereby doing more than was intimated in Grey’s suggestion, which proposed action only after the tenor of the Serbian note should be known. Now Crowe wrote, in a wholly misleading manner, under the announcement that the English suggestion had been passed on to Vienna (No. 149):

Very insidious on the part of the German Government. I presume Sir E. Grey will say something to Prince Lichnowsky about

this somewhat peculiar way of treating our suggestion that Germany should join in making a communication to Vienna.

And in an equally unfriendly tone Nicolson added: "This is the second occasion on which Herr von Jagow has acted similarly."

As a matter of fact Grey did not at all suggest a common Anglo-German action in connection with the Serbian answer, but only a one-sided German move. The mere fact that the suggestion was forwarded at once (G 186, rem. 2; BB 34), went beyond the English intention. After the publication of the Serbian Note the German pressure upon Vienna began immediately (G 277).

2. On the morning of July 29 a telegram was received from Sir E. Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, reporting that the German Chancellor had said he was doing his utmost in order to bring St. Petersburg and Vienna into direct discussion; at the same time Herr von Bethmann complained of the aggravation of the situation through the Russian mobilization against Austria, and of the tone of the French press (No. 249).¹⁹ Under this dispatch the following remarks are found:

Crowe: "It is difficult to believe that the German Government have done anything at all."

Nicolson: "There have certainly been no indications that Germany has exercised any moderating influence at Vienna. It is going rather far to put the responsibility on Russia who has been willing to adopt any and every course likely to lead to peace. I suppose Germany

wishes Russia to join with the other Powers in keeping the ring while Austria strangles Serbia."

In this manner Germany was calumniated to Grey at a moment when she had already proposed to Vienna the program, "Halt in Belgrade," an idea that was later taken up on the British side (G 291 and 323); and this notwithstanding the fact that Lichnowsky had informed Grey in a note to be dated July 28 as follows (No. 236):

I just receive news from Berlin that they have *immediately* taken steps in Vienna in the sense you spoke to me yesterday at noon. They have also communicated to Count Berchtold the desire expressed by M. Sazonow to enter in direct conversation with Vienna. I begin to hope that it has once more been possible owing to Anglo-German collaboration to save the peace of Europe.

One will hardly make a mistake in finding in these misrepresenting marginal remarks the origin of the legend, which was finally adopted by the entire Entente propaganda, that Germany rejected all attempts at mediation; whereas, in truth, she rejected only the conference proposal. On the other hand she accepted in principle the four-powers' mediation, immediately recommended at Vienna the adoption of the Serbian answer as a basis of negotiations, and finally, upon her own initiative, suggested the direct discussion and the "Halt in Belgrade" program.

Similar ill-will toward Germany is expressed in the notations on Documents Nos. 174, 185, 264, and 293.

The Mobilizations

IN the encouragement given to Russia to mobilize and in the contemptuous indifference just mentioned, with which the Foreign Office treated the German Chancellor's anxiety caused by the Russian mobilization, there is displayed a surprising incapacity to understand the military situation. Still more clearly is that incapacity shown in the remarks appended to a dispatch of Buchanan's of July 27 (No. 170),²⁰ who reported as follows:

Order to mobilize (against Austria) might perhaps be accompanied by a statement that the troops would be retained on this side of the frontier. (The Minister) could not tell me when ukase would be issued, but spoke of day on which Austrian army entered Serbia as a likely date.

Crowe's comment upon this dispatch is partly right and partly wrong. He is correct in his belated recognition of the fact that the "real difficulty" would be found in the question of mobilization. Precisely for that reason England should never have encouraged Russia to mobilize against Austria. The Foreign Office was also well-informed as to Germany's war-plan, saying that it was "directed almost entirely against France."

On the other hand, it is a false idea that the Austrian mobilization, ordered on the evening of July 25, was a "serious menace" for Russia. This mobilization, as is well known, was directed only against Serbia. The mobilization against Austria suggested to the Russians

by England could be justified from only one point of view, namely, if Russia's rôle of protectorship over the Slav states, fittingly characterized by Bertie as "absurd and obsolete," were to be recognized as justifiable. It could hardly have been a "menace" to Russia, however, that Austria was sending half of her army far away to the south into the roadless mountainous regions of Serbia, a movement which, from the military standpoint, would mean the greatest imaginable security for Russia. The conclusion drawn by Crowe that it would be "neither possible nor just and wise to make any move to restrain Russia from mobilizing," is also false.

Very inexact among his comments is the assertion that Germany had declared that she would have to mobilize if Russia did so. What Germany declared was that she would have to mobilize only if Russia should also mobilize on the German frontier. Crowe's historical parallel is surprising at the end of his remarks, recalling what a disaster overwhelmed Prussia in 1806 and attributing this to the fact that Prussia had remained neutral in 1805. He then warned England against a like fate. This is the theory of "preventive war" in its purest form! At the same time it is grotesque to compare the little Prussia of 1805 with less than 10 million inhabitants with the British World Empire of 1914 with more than 420 millions.

The whole intellectual processes of the London diplomats during the last week of July were vitiated by a constant confusing of the Austrian partial mobilization against Serbia with the complete Austrian mobilization, and also by confusing the Russian mobilization against Austria alone with Russia's general mobiliza-

tion against Austria and Germany—a confusion that distorted their judgment. Just as dangerous was their exaggerated idea about the military rapidity, bordering upon the miraculous, of Germany, which they thought could mobilize in one day and then cross the French frontier with hundreds of thousands on the next day.

In regard to the Austrian mobilization against Serbia it must be admitted that the laymen, not acquainted with the complicated military affairs of Austria, might have been somewhat misled at first through the reports of the British Military Attaché at Vienna. His reports will be dealt with later in a separate publication.²¹ In any case even the non-expert observer must finally have clearly seen that on July 31 (noon) even the three Austrian corps (I, X, and XI) stationed in Galicia nearest the Russian frontier were not yet mobilized (No. 361), and that the order for general mobilization was given on July 31 about noon at the earliest (Nos. 362, 387, and 427). Quite incomprehensible, for example, is a remark of Nicolson's on July 30: "Surely it was Austria who mobilized before Russia did" (No. 311). Of course, Austria did mobilize first, but only against Serbia. That difference was not recognized or admitted by Nicolson.

Apart from the obviously inevitable recall of the German Fleet from Norwegian waters (Nos. 137, 168, and 254) London had from its own sources—sensational French reports will be looked at later on—down to and including July 30 only unimportant news about any German mobilization.

On July 29: recall of officers on leave (No. 281 was

incorrect; order was only given on the evening of the 29th);

On July 30:

a) safeguarding of the North Sea ports and reinforcement of the garrison of the island of Borkum (Nos. 298 and 314: correct);

b) late evening rumors of troop transports to eastern and western frontiers (No. 313; incorrect, false interpretation of recall of troops from camps to their garrisons, ordered on the evening of the 29th);

c) late in the evening, rumor of an infantry regiment leaving Dresden for the Silesian frontier (No. 315; incorrect).

On the morning of the 31st an "agent" arriving from Cologne reported orally that troop trains were pouring through there to the western frontier (No. 339; this can only refer to the transportation of troops back from camps, unless it was pure invention).²²

Then on August 1, information was obtained from the most trustworthy source for the correction of all the foregoing reports as follows:

a) through the British Military Attaché at Berlin, that up to noon of this day many reserve officers (evidently those who had already been called up for the autumn manœuvres) had been called out, but no reserve men (No. 404);

b) through the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg, that up to July 31 no movement of German troops had been noticed on chief railway lines to the East-Prussian-Russian frontier (No. 410).

Regarding the mobilization in France the following

news from the Embassy and the Military Attaché at Paris was received:

On July 30:

a) Travel in the East of France becoming difficult owing to the moving of troops from the centre of France towards the eastern frontier (No. 320a);

b) frontier-guard placed in positions (No. 320b).²³

On July 31:

a) with singular delay: since July 29 all precautions prior to mobilization carried out, all officers and men on leave rejoining their units, all troops undergoing exercise at camps ordered to rejoin their garrisons (No. 321);

b) the (five) frontier corps have been mobilized (No. 358).

According to this news it must have been clearly known at London on August 1 at the latest that France had gone ahead of Germany with her preparatory mobilization measures. This was still more true of Russia, as was also perfectly well known in London.

London Hears of Russian Mobilization in Good Time, but Conceals the Information

BUCHANAN had already on July 25 announced that the Russian mobilization against Austria would embrace 1,100,000 men (No. 125).²⁴ As the Russian Government learned on the 26th that the Austrian mobilization against Serbia included only 480,000 men (No. 142), this was a very strong "safeguarding" against a "menace" which did not exist.

London Hears of Russian Mobilization

On July 30 at 3:15 P. M. a telegram from Buchanan (No. 302a) was received which contained the following sentence:

Yesterday evening it was decided to issue this morning order for partial mobilization—thirteen army corps referred to in my telegram 182 of July 29, and *at the same to commence preparations for general mobilization.*²⁵

On July 31 at 5:20 P. M. the following telegram was received from Buchanan (No. 347):²⁶

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

This telegram was handed in at St. Petersburg at 6:40 P. M., equivalent to 4:40 London time. Now it is wholly out of the question that in those days a telegram could pass from the receiving desk of the Central Telegraph Office of St. Petersburg to the hands of a cipher clerk of the Foreign Office in London in 40 minutes.²⁷ Headlam-Morley therefore correctly remarks that the telegram probably—he might have said certainly—was dispatched from St. Petersburg 25 hours earlier, namely, July 30 at 6:40 P. M., for Tsar Nicholas made the fatal decision for the second time, and this time definitely, on that afternoon. This error, however, should have been recognized by the higher officials of

the Foreign Office on the next day at the latest, for on August 1 a further telegram from Buchanan was received (No. 410) ²⁸ in which, among other things, was reported:

Notices posted at 4 A. M. on July 31 ordering general mobilization.

If the notices ordering general mobilization were posted at 4 A. M. on July 31, the fact must have been recognized that the decision to issue the orders could not have been made on the afternoon of the same July 31. Nevertheless, even if we assume that people in the Foreign Office paid no attention to the hours of dispatch and time of transmission of the telegram, still we cannot avoid raising the following questions:

1. It was known in London on July 30 at about 4 P. M. (No. 302a) that the decision had been made at St. Petersburg on the day before to begin preparations for the general mobilization. How then could Sir William Tyrell, Grey's Private Secretary, tell Prince Lichnowsky at about 4 P. M. on July 31 that they had "no news of any kind" (!) about the mobilization of the whole Russian Army and Navy? (G 518).

2. England had induced Germany to promise not to mobilize during a Russian mobilization directed only against Austria. Was it fair to Germany to permit Russia, under cover of a mobilization against Austria, to adopt much farther-reaching measures directed against Germany and to give silent approval to them?

3. It was known on July 31 at about 6 P. M. (No. 347) that it had been decided in St. Petersburg to

issue orders for general mobilization. Was it not called for now to inform Lichnowsky that a confirmation had been received from St. Petersburg of the communication that he had made two hours ago?

4. Was it not equally proper that Prime Minister Asquith—who had said in Parliament at 5 P. M. on July 31 that the news of the Russian mobilization had been received, not from St. Petersburg, but from Berlin—²⁹ should correct his statement as soon as possible?

5. After August 1, about 4 P. M. there could have been no doubt that 36 hours previously—that is to say, at 4 A. M. July 31,—Russia had published the order for general mobilization (No. 410); and that the proclamation at Berlin about 1 P. M. on July 31 of the “state of imminent danger of war” was occasioned by that general mobilization. Could England continue an impartial mediation without taking into account this indubitable state of affairs?

Sir Edward Grey, moreover, already knew clearly that Russia had first mobilized, for that evening he said to Cambon (No. 367):

The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilization of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, would precipitate a crisis, and *would make it appear that German mobilization was being forced by Russia.*³⁰

How could it happen that for years, even after the termination of hostilities, this connection of events was concealed in the memoirs of the leading British statesmen? How could Grey write pages 321 and 322 of the first volume of his *Twenty-five Years*?

Very malicious in particular are certain comments under a telegram from Goschen (No. 337), received at 1:45 P. M., July 31, regarding an interview which he had had that morning with the German Chancellor. The telegram began thus:

Chancellor informs me that he had just received news to the effect that Russia *has burnt her cordon of houses along German frontier*, sealed her public offices in neighborhood of frontier and carried off her money chests into the interior. He has been unable to get absolute confirmation of this intelligence as *Russo-German frontier was entirely closed*, but if, as he thinks, it is true, it can only mean that Russia looks upon war as certain, and that she is now taking military measures on the German frontier.

The Chancellor spoke further of the appeal of the German Emperor to the Tsar, and of his own efforts at Vienna which had been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. If now the news he had received proved true and military measures were also being taken against Germany, he could not remain quiet. He was going to see the Emperor and Germany would probably soon have to take some very serious step.⁸¹

Notwithstanding the news in hand since the afternoon of July 30 that Russia on the 29th resolved to begin preparations for the general mobilization (No. 320a), Grey's assistants made the following marginal comments:—

Crowe: "This is an endeavour to throw the blame for military preparations on Russia. All our information shows that short of the issue of actual 'mobiliza-

tion orders' in set terms, German mobilization has for some time been actively proceeding on all three German frontiers."

Nicolson: "Russia is taking very reasonable and sensible precautions, which should in no wise be interpreted as provocative. Germany, of course, who has been steadily preparing, now wishes to throw the blame on Russia—a very thin pretext. However, comments are superfluous."

Crowe and Nicolson presumably did not know that according to Russian mobilization regulations the burning of the booths of the frontier guard was a trustworthy sign of mobilization. Neither could they know that the French General Staff had on the 28th expressed its astonishment at the slight measures of precaution ordered by Germany; that on the 30th the Prussian Ministry of War had rejected a proposal of the General commanding the army corps at Metz to move forward the German frontier guard in answer to extended French measures; and that on the same day a suggestion of Emperor William to call up the reserves for the frontier army corps had been omitted upon the contrary advice of the War Office. As already shown above, however, Crowe and Nicolson had, down to the evening of the 30th, from British sources no news whatever that seriously compromised Germany. On the 31st there was only the story of an "agent" about troop transports at Cologne (No. 339). The marginal comments of the two men quoted above are completely disproved by the British documents now published and are shown to have been a gross deception of their chief, who, of course, had no time to examine all the reports of the previous

days and compare them. The remarks of Nicolson about the "wisdom" of the Russian measures would have seemed monstrous to the author himself if, a few hours later, he reflected a little upon the time of dispatch of the St. Petersburg telegram (No. 347), according to which the decision for the general mobilization had been taken there on the 30th. And what must he have thought when he read on August 1 that the mobilization order had been posted up on the streets of St. Petersburg on the early morning of the 31st (No. 410)?

Sensational French News

THERE is one explanation, but it is not an exculpation for Crowe and Nicolson. They had been misled by France. On the 30th and 31st, Cambon had handed in fanciful statements about ostensible German war preparations. On July 30 it was asserted (No. 319):

a) German frontier guard moved up close to frontier (as a matter of fact the posting of the frontier guard even for Metz was rejected as late as the evening of July 30);

b) French frontier guard moved back 10 kilometers from frontier (admission that the French frontier guard had already been placed in position; comment upon the 10 kilometer withdrawal is superfluous);

c) reinforcement of the garrison of Metz with troops from Cologne or Treves (these troops, 8th army corps and 8th reserve corps, were never transported to Metz but when the concentration began were stationed 50 kilometers for a part, and 70 kilometers for the greater mass, north of Metz);

d) work proceeding on German fortifications (wholly false);

e) calling up of reserves in Germany (contradicted by the British Military Attaché as late as August 1).

On July 31 the items in the French indictment were as follows (No. 338):

a) German outposts close to frontier (can only be true for late afternoon after proclamation of "state of imminent danger of war");

b) yesterday two violations of the frontier by German patrols (this frightful crime consisted, according to French testimony, in the fact that two non-commissioned officers galloped two or three hundred meters beyond the frontier and back); ³²

c) repetition of the news about troops from Cologne and Treves;

d) fifteenth army corps moved forward to the frontier (may be true for the late afternoon for the frontier guard);

e) reserves called up "by the ten thousands" (compare the contrary report of the British Military Attaché of August 1);

f) according to all information German preparations began on the 25th (pure fantasy).

If Crowe and Nicolson based their comments upon these French accusations—of which the second apparently originated on the evening of the 31st and could not yet have been seen by them before writing their almost incredible comments—they thereby gave proof of an irresponsible dependence upon France in military questions. The report of their Military Attaché at Paris July 29 (No. 321), which certainly must have

been in their hands by the morning of the 31st, must have enlightened them as to how very far the mobilization in France had advanced beyond that of Germany. "*All precautions prior to a mobilization have been carried out and it now only remains for the button to be pressed for the necessary reservists to be called up.*" It appears, however, that the reports of the British Ambassadors and the British Military Attachés weighed lightly in military matters when compared with what the French asserted. Cambon on the morning of the 31st had made the false statement to Nicolson that Germany was really mobilizing and merely had not yet issued the decree of mobilization (No. 339). The absurdity, accordingly, that a country in the very heart of Europe could have called millions of men to the colors and secretly levied hundreds of thousands of horses must be true! What would have been said if Germany had with such inexcusable levity based her conception of the Russian mobilization exclusively or chiefly upon communications from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin?

Equally bad was the swindling of public opinion by the British *Blue Book* of 1914.³³ In its first edition of August 6, 1914, the French indictment of July 31 was sent down to the Department as an enclosure in a letter of the 30th from Grey to Bertie (BB 105). That may have been an oversight such as is likely to occur in hurried work. When the attention of the editors of the *Blue Book* was drawn to the impossibility of such a date, they did not, in the second edition of September 1914, put the document into the proper place, but simply cancelled the date "July 31" and let it go for

The British Decision

twelve years as an enclosure to the letter of the 30th. That was no longer an oversight! Moreover, at the request of the British Government a similar modification (sic!) was made in the French *Yellow Book*, with the result that a document was printed there also under a wrong date. As if the *Yellow Book* did not already upon its own initiative contain enough forgeries! One would like to assume that no authoritative official in the "British Government" caused this manœuvre.

The British Decision

July 29

IN spite of the efforts of his assistants Grey struggled a long time against decisive steps. His personal point of view, as he himself emphasized, was not different in principle from theirs; but, on the one hand, he recognized the fact that an open promise of armed assistance to France and Russia would strengthen and encourage the war parties of those countries, and on the other hand, he saw clearly that the majority of the Cabinet would not yet consent to such a promise.

The two sides of his own point of view and the policy officially pursued were shown especially in his conversations with the French Ambassador. Thus he told Cambon on July 29 that England could not intervene in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav. If, however, Germany and France were drawn in, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, then England would have to make her decision (No.

283). Was that a rejection, or an indirect promise? Could a struggle between Teuton and Slav be thought of without Germany being drawn in? At the same time Grey drew Cambon's attention anew to the preparedness of the British Fleet and told him that he was about to warn the German Ambassador not to be deceived by a wrong belief that England would stand aside. And the British sea-power was prepared to a high degree; for on the day before this conversation—i. e. on the forenoon of July 28—before the Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia, Churchill had, again upon his own responsibility, sent the Fleet to its war-station at Scapa Flow. The Prime Minister had consented, and in the gray twilight of July 29 the squadrons steamed away with lights turned out. In the course of the 29th—again without asking for a Cabinet vote—the “warning telegram” was sent out to the army and navy, which is equivalent to the declaration of the “state of imminent danger of war” in Germany.

July 30

In the morning came Goschen's report about Bethmann's feeler of the previous evening from which it appeared that in case of war with France, Germany would guarantee Belgium's integrity but not her neutrality (No. 293; G 373). As is well known and is now admitted by every informed person, there set in simultaneously with this German feeler the strongest imaginable German pressure upon the Vienna Cabinet to come to terms (G 395 and 396). A marginal comment of

Crowe's, however, interpreted the Chancellor's question as clear proof that Germany wanted war and was hitherto held back only through fear of England. In the afternoon Germany's feeler was rejected by Grey in a sharp note (No. 303). It is a characteristic fact that his assistants were not satisfied with his conciliatory closing passage because—it "might not be acceptable to France."³⁴ In this way they unconsciously expressed a very correct judgment of Poincaré's policy.

While the sharp note to Berlin was being written, the above-mentioned information that Russia had decided on the day before to begin preparations for the general mobilization was received (No. 302a). Meanwhile a note of the French Government of the following tenor must have been handed over by Cambon: Russia has decided to expedite her arming; England is begged to declare solidarity; France is resolved to fulfill all her duties as an ally; but she wishes that Russia avoid giving Germany occasion for a German mobilization (No. 294).³⁵ Finally, Grey by about this time must have had in his hands the private letter from Bertie concerning the attitude of the French Government as being far from putting pressure on Russia to moderate her zeal (No. 320).

London, however, was not willing to admit Russia's will for war as revealed through facts, or France's unconditional following in Russia's wake; London saw only Germany's eventual war-plan. For several days Grey had known that the Conservative opposition, the majority of which was already inclined to give France unconditional support, would be unanimous for the war in case the neutrality of Belgium should be jeopard-

ized.³⁶ He knew also how powerful an influence the Belgian question would exert upon his own party. Therefore he did not delay in making use of this weapon against the peace wing of his colleagues of the Cabinet. On the same day also both Goschen's report and Grey's answer were read to the Cabinet, and they approved what had been done.³⁷

Late in the evening of the 30th, Bertie sent an urgent request from Poincaré for an immediate declaration of solidarity from England (No. 318). The Ambassador had explained his objections to the President of the Republic, objections which this time even Crowe approved inasmuch as a declaration of unconditional solidarity with France and Russia might "induce and determine these two Powers to choose the path of war." He added indeed in a hedging manner that if France and Russia could not avoid going to war England must go, with them; this without any consideration, moreover, of the Belgian question.

July 31

In the course of this day the reports already discussed came in rapidly. A comparison of them would have shown the priority of Russia's war preparations over Austria's and Germany's as well as of the French preparations over Germany's; but such a comparison was not made. On the other hand, Grey took a decisive step on the Belgian question in the afternoon. He caused the question to be put in Berlin and in Paris as to whether the respective Governments were prepared to

engage to respect Belgian neutrality so long as no other Power violated it (No. 348). The British Minister at Brussels was also informed of this inquiry, with the following important addition (No. 351):

“In view of existing treaties you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say I assume that Belgium will to the utmost of her power maintain neutrality and desire and expect other Powers to observe and uphold it.”³⁸

As Grey knew from the conversation between Goschen and Bethmann what Germany's answer would be, he had, so far as he personally was concerned, already made his decision *de facto*. He could hardly call upon Belgium to defend her neutrality to the utmost unless he were resolved to come to her assistance. And he knew that the strongest party in Parliament³⁹ without an exception, as well as the strong imperialistic wing of his own party, would support his decision.

Nevertheless, he still made no binding engagements with France. Both in his answer (No. 352) to Poincaré's urgency of the day before and in a conversation with Cambon (No. 367) substantially the same words as those of the 30th were again used—those words with their two faces, one representing his own views, the other England's official policy which was repugnant to him—words that meant a refusal indeed for the present, but left open a hope for the future. The cause of his reserve was a Cabinet decision, the reasons for which he thus explained to Cambon:

“The commercial and financial situation was exceedingly serious; there was danger of a complete collapse that would involve us and everyone in ruin; and it was

possible that our standing aside might be the only means of preventing a complete collapse of European credit, in which we should be involved. This might be a paramount consideration in deciding our attitude.”⁴⁰

Indignant at this Cabinet vote, Crowe and Nicolson seized their pens. Crowe’s very long memorandum developed the following thoughts (condensed from No. 369):

The theory that England cannot engage in a big war means her abdication as an independent State. In that case she needs no army or navy, and the expenditures for those purposes have no justification. The general principle of British foreign policy would stand proclaimed as an empty futility, for a balance of power⁴¹ cannot be maintained by a State that is incapable of fighting and consequently carries no weight. At the opening of any war there is a commercial panic, for commercial opinion is generally timid. The present panic in the city has been largely influenced by the deliberate acts of German (!) financial houses.

It has been the unremitting effort of Germany to induce England to declare herself neutral in case Germany were at war with France and Russia; England persistently declined this as incompatible with her ‘duty to France and Russia’ and also to England herself.

If it be now held that we were entirely justified in remaining neutral while Germany falls upon France, it was wrong yesterday to think that we were asked to enter into a dishonorable bargain; for at least terms were offered which were of some value for France and Belgium. We are apparently now willing to do what we scornfully declined to do yesterday, with the consequence that we lose the compensating advantages accompanying yesterday’s offer.

The argument that there is no written bond binding us to France is strictly correct. But ‘the Entente has been made,

strengthened, put to the test, and celebrated in a manner justifying the belief that a moral bond was being forged. The whole policy of the Entente can have no meaning if it does not signify that in a just quarrel England would stand by her friends.'

The question is not whether we are capable of taking part in a war, but whether we should go into the present war. This is a question firstly of right or wrong, and secondly of political expediency.

If the question were argued on this basis, I feel confident that our duty and our interest will be seen to lie in standing by France in her hour of need. France has not sought the quarrel. It has been forced upon her.

Nicolson's letter was briefer (No. 368):

It seems to me most essential, whatever our future course may be in regard to intervention, that we should at once give orders for the mobilization of the army. It is useless to shut our eyes to the fact that possibly within the next 24 hours Germany will be moving across the French frontier—and if public opinion, at present so bewildered and partially informed, is ready in event of German invasion of France to stand by the latter, if we are not mobilized our aid would be too late. Mobilization is a precautionary and not a provocative measure—and to my mind is essential.

A refutation of the numerous erroneous statements in these two hot-blooded effusions may be dispensed with. Only one point merits attention: that they demand the unconditional support of France without any reference to Belgium.

Grey's view on this day is revealed in a comment made to Nicolson's proposal: "There is much force in this.

We ought to prepare and I think it should be considered early tomorrow."

The impression which Cambon received from his conversation with Grey was sent to Paris at 9:49 P. M. on the 31st, thus: "Sir Edward Grey supports an immediate intervention; he threatened Prince Lichnowsky with it; but the Council of Ministers did not believe that the Government would be able to obtain the consent of Parliament."⁴²

Cambon had accordingly got this impression of Grey's attitude before the German and French answers regarding Belgium were received.

Late in the evening there arrived from Paris the news about Germany's inquiry as to what would be France's attitude in case of a Russo-German war (No. 357). At midnight a German complaint giving full details about Russia's general mobilization (No. 372; G 513) was received, which was evidently not without effect upon Grey, inasmuch as he induced King George at midnight to send inquiry to the Tsar (No. 384). That was the last effort at Peace, for as Sir Edward himself finally recognized (No. 422) all "peace formulas" were hopeless unless Russia stopped her general mobilization. It is known from Buchanan's memoirs how he sabotaged this last effort through the dilatory execution of his commission and dictated to the Tsar a lying excuse (No. 490). It is a new fact that a copy of Grey's appeal was also sent to Paris for direct delivery to the President of the Republic, whose dishonest answer turns the sequence of the mobilizations topsy-turvy (No. 403).⁴³

August 1.

Early in the morning the answers from Paris and Berlin regarding Belgium were received (Nos. 382 and 383). Crowe and Nicolson did not conceal their satisfaction at the evasive answer from Berlin. Then followed the well-known dispatches from the Petersburg and Paris Embassies which might have brought a definite clearing-up of the priority of the Russian and French war preparations—if such a clearing-up had been wished and sought for.

Churchill had looked forward to the meeting of the Cabinet on this day with such great confidence that even before the Ministers assembled he gave orders to the navy to hold everything in readiness for the expected mobilization order.⁴⁴ But matters turned out otherwise. Grey began to have doubts. Between 10 and 11 A. M. he sent word to Lichnowsky that he wished to make a new proposal for the prevention of the great catastrophe (G 562). Between 1 and 2 P. M.—i. e., after the close of the Cabinet meeting—he again promised to make specific proposals for the neutrality of England *even in the event that Germany should be at war with Russia and France* (G 570). Between 3 and 4 the Ambassador had a meeting with Grey, who raised the question as to whether it would not be possible that Germany and France, in the event of a Russo-German war, might stand fully armed against each other, but without making an attack (G 596). At 5:30 this proposal was telegraphed to Paris (No. 419). Although

Germany had agreed to the proposal (G 575, 578, 579), it was dropped on the next day by Grey (No. 460) because Bertie's answer was to the effect that it was incompatible with the Franco-Russian alliance (No. 453).⁴⁵

It was not by any means, therefore, a case of "misunderstanding," as Grey asserts (*Twenty-five Years* II, p. 313) but of a proposal which apparently was discussed even by the Cabinet, and of which it must be said that one can not form any idea as to how it could have taken practical shape. Also in the conversation with Cambon on this day the same idea was discussed. This conversation, which took place after the Cabinet meeting, was of the following tenor (condensed from Nos. 426 and 447⁴⁶):

"The present position differs entirely from that during the Morocco crisis. Today Germany is willing not to attack France if France remains neutral in a Russo-German war. If France can not take advantage of this position, that is because of her alliance with Russia to which England is not a party and the terms of which England does not know. This does not mean that England under no circumstances will assist France, but it does mean that France must take her own decision without reckoning upon English help."

Cambon said that he could not transmit this reply to his Government (!), and he asked therefore to be authorized to report that the Cabinet had not yet taken any decision. To this Grey replied that the Cabinet had reached a decision, namely, that it could not propose to Parliament to send an expeditionary force to the Continent.

Now the Ambassador played his trump card, the Anglo-French Naval Agreement of 1912. The French coasts, he said, were unprotected and exposed to a German attack. Grey replied that this might alter public feeling in England and so might a violation of Belgian neutrality; both questions would be discussed anew by the Cabinet. At the same time Grey told the Ambassador of Germany's evasive answer and added that he would lay this answer before the Cabinet and ask for authority to declare in Parliament on Monday (Aug. 3) that England could not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality (F 126⁴⁷), and he would move further that the position of the French coasts should also be taken under consideration.

Cambon had also broached the subject of the French coasts to Nicolson (No. 424). Beneath Nicolson's memorandum on this subject Grey wrote: "I have spoken to the Prime Minister and attach great importance to the point being settled tomorrow."⁴⁸

Grey had given a negative answer to the German Ambassador's question as to whether England would obligate herself to remain neutral if Germany would promise to respect Belgium's neutrality. He gave a similar answer also to the further question as to whether he could formulate any conditions under which England would remain neutral (No. 448; G 596). In his *Twenty-five Years* Grey writes (I, p. 330): "If Germany had asked whether on this condition (respecting Belgian neutrality) we would remain neutral, there would presumably have been discussion on this new feature in the Cabinet."

But Grey did not even lay Lichnowsky's question

before the Cabinet. The Ambassador, indeed, had spoken upon his own initiative without a commission; Sir Edward, however, could not know that, and he did not even try to ascertain whether the questions originated with the German Government.

Toward midnight the news of Germany's declaration of war upon Russia reached the leading Cabinet members assembled about Asquith. As they were dispersing, Grey remarked to Churchill: "I have just taken a very important step. I have said to Cambon that we would not permit the German Fleet to steam into the Channel." The chief of the Admiralty hurried to his office and issued the mobilization order. And so armed assistance at sea was promised to France without a decision of the Cabinet, and the Fleet was mobilized contrary to a decision of the Cabinet.

August 2

In the forenoon the Cabinet approved the promise of protection for the French coast by the British Fleet. Nevertheless, Grey had to explain this decision to Cambon (No. 487) to the effect that England was obligated to go to war against Germany only if the German Fleet really attacked the French coasts. The sending of a British expeditionary force to the Continent was, therefore, not involved. To Cambon's question as to whether England would never do that, the answer was as usual a comforting but vague reference to the future; but this limitation, Grey added, applied only to the present situation. A German march into Luxemburg, according to

the principles regarded in 1867 as valid, could not be taken as a cause for war. On the other hand, the Cabinet was considering whether it should tomorrow declare in Parliament the violation of Belgium's neutrality to be a *casus belli*. According to the French Ambassador, however, this sentence took the definite form that England would regard such a violation as a cause for war (F 137).

During the Cabinet-meeting a letter from the Conservative leaders (Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne) was received, which advocated unconditional support of France and Russia without any mention whatever of the Belgian question. This meant a substantial strengthening of the war party in the Cabinet.

As for the rest, Germany and France on this day contended for a friendly attitude on the part of England by sending reports of violations of territory by the other side. French imagination won a decisive victory over the German in this struggle. As early as August 1 the mobilized German forces near Metz and Diedenhofen had risen in the French reports to eight army corps (!) in war strength on the French frontier (Nos. 425 and 452). "Twenty thousand troops" were reported to have crossed the frontier into the region of Nancy (No. 486). A German advance toward Longwy was also announced (No. 473), and the forts of that town claimed to have fired upon a German column that existed only in their imagination (No. 507). Crowe's lively and wishful imagination already saw the German armies marching into France without a declaration of war (No. 471). Compared with these lying exaggerations the much-ridiculed report about the dropping of bombs near

Nuremberg⁴⁹ and the automobile ride of disguised French officers fade into nothingness.

August 3

In the forenoon the hopes which the English war party had built upon the promise of protection for the French coasts broke down. Prime Minister Asquith had on the day before spoken to the German Ambassador on this point (G 676 and 669), and upon Lichnowsky's report on the subject Germany gave the undertaking that she would in no way menace the North Coast of France as long as England remained neutral (No. 431; G 714). A notice in the *Westminster Gazette* about this matter naturally caused quite a flurry in the Foreign Office (No. 536).

About 3 P. M. Parliament met. Grey, with amazing hypocrisy and deceptiveness, spoke in great detail about the defenseless state of the French coasts, just as if there were no German promise not to attack them. Only at the end of his lengthy remarks, which were calculated to shake the inclination to neutrality on the part of the peace party, did he mention this German promise,⁵⁰ adding, however, that it was "far too narrow an engagement."

Then he turned to the Belgian question and stated that a telegram about the German ultimatum had been received from the British Minister at Brussels (No. 521).

After the conclusion of the speech but before adjournment of the sitting a communication was brought

Details of the Final Days

to Grey from the Belgian Minister in London, in which the latter confirmed the news that Germany had handed Belgium an ultimatum (No. 515). The feeling of the great majority of the House had already made it evident that the House was content to regard the violation of Belgium's neutrality as a cause for war.

Details of the Final Days

COUNT BERCHTOLD had already on August 2 told the British Ambassador that Austria must consider herself as in a state of war with Russia (No. 493). The theory that Austria was driven against her will by Germany to recognize the state of war should thereby be regarded as definitely disposed of. From other sources, too, it is sufficiently known that the delay of Austria's declaration of war upon Russia was due exclusively to military considerations, particularly to the necessity of transferring troops from Serbia to the Russian border.

The Russian communiqué of August 2 appears in the British Documents in a form which, so far as I am aware, is unknown in Germany (No. 532). In it Sazonov explains the general Russian mobilization by alleging merely that the usefulness of negotiations with Austria had been affected by the bombardment of Belgrade (*le bombardement de Belgrade affectait la valeur des négociations avec l'Autriche*). Precisely so; an evil conscience looks for the most varied excuses.

PART THREE

Conclusions

Grey's Attitude and Germany's Policies

GREY's policy was one which involved few perplexities or uncertainties in regard to fundamentals, but was, on the other hand, heavily weighted with prejudices. Impressions which he had received as a young man from the influence of the nimbus surrounding Gladstone may have contributed substantially to this result and to his repugnance for Prusso-German "militarism" and Austro-Hungarian "oppression of nationalities." As early as the period between 1892 and 1895 he had inwardly enlisted his sympathies against Germany and for France and Russia. That was before the Kruger telegram, before the first modest German naval program, before the occupation of Kiaochau, before Emperor William's speech at Damascus, before the hesitating treatment of England's offers of an alliance—in short, before all the acts in which German and foreign critics were hitherto accustomed to find the causes of the Anglo-German estrangement. The important innovation of the "New Régime"¹ down to the year 1895 consisted—apart from the ephemeral "German-French-Russian Triple Alliance" in the Shimonoseki question—precisely in the fact that it sailed rather quickly and conspicuously in the wake of England through the sacrifice of relations with St. Petersburg, through the conclusion of the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty, through German

and Italian visits and speeches, and through Italo-Austro-British Fleet fraternizations. Through these means Germany substantially strengthened the position of England as against Russia.

In the three years 1892-1895, furthermore, the Franco-Russian Alliance—concluded self-evidently by France against Germany, but by Russia against England²—had been more and more developed from year to year, so that the British Admiralty was compelled to undertake larger and larger building programs against the Franco-Russian sea-power. In France, where the Dreyfus affair had followed upon the Panama scandal, very ungracious nicknames were applied to England in the literary salons of Paris.³

If one bears in mind the time of Grey's choice, one is forced to the conclusion that Grey's repugnance to Germany was not due to any special peculiarities of the Government of William II, but that it existed already in the germ against the Germany of Bismarck, upon whom Grey's fellow-countryman, the eminent historian Gooch, gave his judgment that the founder of the German Empire was "the pillar of European peace." It was not "militarist" Germany, as the current formula ran, but the Germany that was militantly strong, that was forging forward powerfully in commerce, navigation, and industry—it was this Germany that was unsympathetic to Lord Rosebery's assistant. Only a slight impression is therefore made upon informed readers by the paragraphs of his book in which he quotes Bismarck's ghost; for all the reproaches that he puts into the mouth of Bismarck against the policy of his successors refer to the period after 1895. Also the

question must be raised as to what permanence could have been vouchsafed to an Anglo-German alliance under the lead of a Minister who feared that the result of such an alliance would have been "German predominance and British dependence" (I, p. 236).

While Grey lacked a sympathetic attitude toward Germany, he held exaggerated ideas of Germany's strength. It appeared to him to be "unprecedented."⁴ And yet Germany's land army (next to Russia) and her fleet (next to England) held the second place, her economic and financial development (next to the United States and England) the third, her colonial possessions (next to England, France, Russia, the United States, Japan, Holland, and Belgium) the eighth place.

Toward France Grey's policy was thoroughly consistent. Its leading note remained ever that which was stated in 1906: "cordial coöperation with France in all parts of the world." At times coöperation intensified itself to dependence, so that important affairs with other countries could only be settled after questioning Paris. The change of front in France's policy in respect to Russia's Balkan plans in the fall of 1912 appears not to have been recognized by Sir Edward. He admits indeed that during the conference of 1913 the French Ambassador, Cambon, was Russophile to a high degree and would have liked "a little less neutrality, even a little more partisanship" (for Russia); but he never reached Count Benckendorff's clear perception of France's slender attachment to peace.

Less consistent than Grey's attitude toward France was his attitude toward Russia. It did not rest upon sympathy, but exclusively upon considerations of policy

based upon the perception that England could not at the same time be friendly with France and hostile to Russia, and that in case of an Anglo-German conflict a Russia strong in arms would prove a useful ally. His traditionally adamant attitude toward Russia in the question of the Straits, however, continued to exist till during the World War it was suddenly transformed into great mildness—at the price, to be sure, of abundant compensations for England. As a result of this inconsistency the understanding initiated at Buchlau in 1908 between the Hapsburg Monarchy and the Tsar's Empire was thwarted. An Austria-Hungary to which Russia would have definitely conceded the possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a Russia whose Black Sea Fleet would have been freed from the humiliating enclosure, might have lived many years in friendship—a long enough time to permit the Archduke Francis Ferdinand to settle the nationality question in the Danubian Monarchy by means of the tripartite federative constitution intended by him.⁵

England's basic engagement toward France affords the complete explanation of why all German attempts undertaken after 1905 to reach a good understanding with England—and the German Ambassadors did not neglect such efforts, both within the limits of their instructions and upon their own initiative—could not succeed. Grey's silence upon the question as to whether for England good relations with Germany were compatible with friendship for France is characteristic. Grey was precisely of the opinion that Alsace-Lorraine was a bar to any “real *rapprochement* between France and Germany.” That this was “more so than ever” was

confirmed to him by Clemenceau (*Twenty-five Years*, Appendix C, p. 305). That considerable section of English public opinion which in 1911 regarded the Foreign Office in general and Grey in particular as "unduly anti-German" (I, p. 217) judged correctly.

The cause for the estrangement between Germany and England, as can be seen even from Grey's book, cannot be found exclusively in Germany's naval policy. A distinctly more important cause is found in Germany's Turkish policy. The *British Documents on the Origin of the War* show, however, that the cause for England's hatred of Germany cannot be traced back to any such simple formula. Instead that cause was rather a wholly exaggerated idea of Germany's strength in all spheres, especially in that of land warfare. A British Imperialist, transferring his own way of thinking to the German Government would necessarily reach the conclusion that, along with such preëminent strength, would inevitably be joined—at first through a sort of Napoleonic dictatorship on the Continent—a striving after world-dominion. The over-estimation of Germany's strength would probably have been still more excessive if Germany had more fully developed her land forces and restricted her naval armament in consideration of the dangers of a war on two fronts.

It is true that the Naval Agreement of 1912, which was a consequence of the last German Naval Bill, constituted, formally considered, the strongest chain that bound England to France and made the protection of the French coasts in any Franco-German war a duty for England. Cambon skilfully used this argument upon Grey. The latter snatched it up at once and made use

of it in his speech of August 3, although at that time it had already been eliminated through a declaration of the German Government that they would not attack the French coasts if England remained neutral. In consequence of this German promise the Naval Agreement could no longer be considered as a factor in the case.

Also, Crowe's memorandum of July 31 is altogether right in pointing out that it was not one agreement or another that morally riveted England to France for any just war, but the whole manner in which "the Entente had been made, strengthened, put to the test, and celebrated." That any war that appeared to lie in harmony with the interests of Great Britain was a "just" one, did not seem to need any further proof.

Now the new documents show that England felt herself strongly bound not only to France, but also to Russia, because people in London feared a German-Russian understanding and saw a real danger in it. It is singular that from this very Germany, which, according to the ultimatum of June, 1919, was sowing discord everywhere, a willingness to come to an understanding with Russia or England was feared above everything else. Paris and St. Petersburg lived in anxiety in 1914 about an Anglo-German understanding, and London about a German-Russian agreement.

Neither Grey nor Nicolson or even Crowe wanted the war as such, but all three wanted England to fight on the side of Russia and France in case a war broke out, and indeed without any question of Belgium. The point of time at which they looked upon the war as unavoidable was different with the three men. Crowe had obviously reached this decision definitely by July 25, Grey

apparently not before the evening of August 1. Efforts at mediation after that time cannot therefore be taken seriously.

Likewise the Conservative party had reached a similar decision at the latest on August 1, and the same is true of the Imperialist wing of the Liberal party led by Churchill. On the other hand, it may be assumed that the peace wing of the Cabinet, if it had been informed in due time about Germany's promise respecting the French coasts, could have been brought to support the war only through the Belgian question. It is difficult to say what course events would have taken if Germany had had a different plan of war, if the peace wing of the Cabinet had won out and Grey had resigned as he intended to do in that event.

A discussion of the military problem as to whether a different plan of operation was possible for Germany may be left to the military experts. It may be regarded, however, as probable that a mere renunciation of the coup against Liège, which had little to commend itself even from the military standpoint, would have rendered unnecessary the premature feeler thrown out to England about Belgium (July 29) and the premature delivery of the ultimatum at Brussels (August 2). Perhaps such a renunciation would have hindered, not indeed the participation of England in the war in the long run, but would have at least made the English declaration of war as early as August 4 very difficult.

PART FOUR

Notes

Part One

1. Page references in the text refer, unless otherwise stated, to Lord Grey's *Twenty-five Years*.

2. The strength of the German army on a war footing in 1914 was only a little greater than that of France; the German peace strength was even less than the French. See the writings of the foremost French expert, General Buat, *L'Armée allemande pendant la Guerre de 1914-1918*.

3. On this point see *Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, v. VIII, nos. 1816 and 1830. Also the proof by Professor Mendelssohn Bartholdy in the *Europäischen Gesprächen*, January 1926, p. 32 ff., that the German procedure at that time was within the lines of the approved Bismarckian policy.

4. At that time England wanted, in the event of a war with France, to make sure of the coöperation of Italy; and Germany intimated that she might, if necessary, give active assistance to her Italian ally. (*Grosse Politik*, v. VIII, nos. 1752-1753). For the fruitless courting of Germany by the Prince of Wales for a definite promise from Germany, see Haller: *Aus dem Leben des Fürsten Philipp zu Eulenburg*, pp. 84 ff. In Parliament, fourteen days previously (July 17), Grey had declared that the "independence and integrity of Siam is a matter of the most serious importance for the British and still more for the British-Indian Empire; and the Government is fully conscious of its responsibility." (Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, v. XIV, col. 1712.)

5. In this case Grey, if his memory had served him well, might have spoken of a German demand having the char-

acter of an ultimatum. For the German protest, see note of the German Ambassador at London, dated June 11, 1894, to the British Minister for Foreign Affairs in the *Staatsarchiv*, v. LVII, p. 32, no. 10,581. For England's giving way, *loc. cit.*, p. 34, no. 10,585. See also instruction to German Ambassador at Vienna of June 15, *Grosse Politik*, v. VIII, no. 2055.

6. According to a chart showing the strength of navies published by the British Admiralty in 1893, Germany then stood in the fifth and last position among the European Great Powers. Number of ship units: Great Britain 325, France 220, Russia 130, Italy 93, Germany 87. In the period 1894-1899 the British navy was increased against Russia and France by 173 units. As late as 1899, shortly before the close of the First Peace Conference at the Hague, the British Parliament, owing to Russia's ship-building program, voted \$112,000,000 for new ships.

7. Chamberlain spoke at Leicester on November 29 and 30, 1899, the first speech chiefly about the Boer War, the second about an Anglo-American-German triple alliance, which latter is partly quoted by Grey (p. 41).

8. *Grosse Politik*, v. XV, nos. 4384 and 4387.

9. *Ibid.* ch. CIII: "Die Interventionsfrage im Burenkrieg," especially nos. 4463-4465, 4471-4474, 4484, 4494. Also for calumniations of German policy, nos. 4469, 4470, 4495, 4497.

10. *Ibid.* no. 4475. See also no. 4480 for letter of the Prince of Wales to Emperor William of March 7, 1900: "We hope that we can always look upon Germany as our best friend as long as you are at the helm."

11. Debate in Parliament on June 10, 1898, particularly the speeches of Asquith and Sir Charles Dilke. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, v. LVIII, cols. 1320, 1337, 1348 ff.

12. *Times* of December 1, 2 and 4, 1900.

13. *Grosse Politik*, v. XXIX, no. 10,791; also *Sénat, Débats Parlementaires*, particularly Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, February 6, 1912, p. 161, col. 1 and 2; and de Lamarzelles, February 7, 1912, p. 166, col. 1.

14. Declaration of Bebel in the Reichstag on March 29, 1905 (Stenographic Reports 1903-1905, p. 5697, col. 1): "If the Imperial Government is trying to prevent that through the Agreement which was concluded between England and France more than a year ago, and which provided, briefly stated, that France's sovereignty over Morocco should be recognized, and that after thirty years France should be in a position to shut out all economic competition from foreign States in Morocco—I say, that if the Imperial Government is trying to combat this Agreement, which in our opinion damages Germany's interests most severely, we shall not only offer no resistance to the Government, but we shall support it in such an effort ("Quite right!" from the Socialists). Only one thing surprises us in this matter: that only now, after the lapse of more than a year, the attempt is made to establish, so far as possible, respect for German interests in Morocco, whereas in our opinion this should have been done immediately after the Agreement was published, when the Imperial Government—although not through official channels, yet in some other way—obtained information about this Agreement."

15. Repington, *The First World War*, v. I, pp. 3 ff.

16. For a fuller explanation of this, see the remarks of Professor Mendelssohn Bartholdy in "Europäischen Gesprächen" for December, 1925, pp. 606 ff.

17. Viscount Haldane, *Before the War*, p. 32.

18. *Grosse Politik*, v. XXI, No. 7191, p. 445.

19. Viscount Haldane, *loc. cit.*, p. 38.

20. Bertha von Suttner, *Der Kampf um Vermeidung des Weltkrieges*, v. II, p. 42.

21. Now Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 1904-1906 Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1906-1910.

22. "Correspondence respecting the Second Peace Conference."

23. For similar attacks upon German selfishness, whereas Great Britain alone among the Powers acted from motives of pure idealism, see pp. 167, 187, 237, 249.

24. Compare Grey, p. 54.

25. See H. Friedjung, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1884-1914*, v. II, pp. 32 and 247. See also *Grosse Politik*, v. XXVI, Part I, no. 8930 note.

26. Compare here the English memorandum of October 14, 1908, which denotes a flat rejection of Isvolski's proposal (*Livre Noir*, v. II, p. 458).

27. Dr. M. Bogitshevich, formerly Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, *Kriegsursachen*, p. 152.

28. Loc. cit., p. 157.

29. *Grosse Politik*, v. XXVI, Part I, no. 9014.

30. Nicolson, now Lord Carnock, was British Ambassador at St. Petersburg from 1905 or 1906 to 1910, then permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, 1910-1916.

31. These newspaper quotations are from Bassermann's speech in the Reichstag of April 30, 1907. Stenographic reports, v. CCXXVIII, p. 1243, cols. 1, 2, p. 1246, col. 1.

32. Probably Grey is thinking of Hardinge's report on the conversation with Kaiser Wilhelm at Cronberg on August 11, 1908. This report was printed by *The Times*, November 10, 1924.

33. Conrad, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*, v. I, p. 55: "Upon the occasion of an audience at Ischl the Emperor said to me that when King Edward was here he wanted to win me away from the alliance with Germany." Margutti in his book, *Vom alten Kaiser*, reports similarly: pp. 319, 321,

351-53, 355. Musulin in *Das Haus am Ballplatz*, p. 167, had it differently, saying that it was only a suggestion that the Emperor Francis Joseph should exert his influence upon Germany in the direction of limiting the naval program. See, however, in this connection the critical remarks in *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte*, November, 1925, p. 535.

34. Secretary of State Kiderlen-Wächter had indeed thought earlier in May of an occupation of Moroccan ports, but only as "pledges," not as an "annexation." At the beginning of July he applied a rather unflattering epithet to a National Liberal leader who was not willing to believe that annexation was not intended. *Grosse Politik*, v. XXIX, no. 10,549; Jäckh, *Kiderlen-Wächter, der Staatsmann und Mensch*, p. 122 f.

35. For the disputed origin, see *Grosse Politik*, v. XXIX, no. 10,586, p. 162 note.

36. The present statement of Grey regarding the origin of Lloyd George's speech agrees fairly well with that of Churchill, *The World Crisis*, pp. 46 f. Conflicting statements, like Grey's speech in Parliament on November 27, 1911, and occasional utterances by Lloyd George, in which he declines all responsibility (*Grosse Politik*, v. XXIX 10,621, note) do not count as against the above authorities.

37. For positive declarations by Kaiser Wilhelm that it must not lead to war, on April 30 and May 23, see *Grosse Politik*, v. XXIX, no. 10,548 and 10,562. The Kaiser was also originally against the dispatch of ships, *loc. cit.*, 10,538.

38. *Ibid.*, nos. 10,607, 10,608, 10,613-14; Jäckh, *loc. cit.*, pp. 126-128.

39. Siebert, *loc. cit.*, p. 435. In like tenor the Russian Ambassador in Berlin wrote on October 13: "In the first place, the Kaiser resolved at the very beginning of the crisis not to let it lead to war." *Loc. cit.*, p. 445.

40. Siebert, p. 435.

41. On the origin of the war of 1870 see the great work of Hermann Oncken, *Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleon III.*

42. See Barnes, *Genesis of the World War* revised edition, p. 524.

43. Poincaré, *Le Lendemain d'Agadir*, p. 165.

44. Poincaré, *loc. cit.*, p. 166 f.

45. Poincaré, *loc. cit.*, p. 168. The German Secretary of State, moreover, had met Haldane two or three days previously with the Imperial Chancellor. Haldane, *Before the War*, p. 62.

46. For the various formulas for a neutrality agreement, discussed one after the other, see Bethmann-Hollweg, *Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege*, v. I, p. 50 ff.

47. The description of Bertie's step and its effect upon Poincaré is based upon the latter's story in *Le Lendemain d'Agadir*, pp. 170 ff.

48. Isvolski to Sazonov, December 5, 1912, *Livre Noir*, v. I, p. 365-366.

49. Poincaré to the French Ambassador at London, January 23, 1922, in *Documents relatifs aux Négociations concernant les Garanties de Sécurité*. no. 23, p. 119. Also *Le Lendemain d'Agadir*, pp. 183-184. According to the French General Staff's work, *Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre*, v. I, p. 50) the Military Convention of 1911 provided that "the debarkations of the British Army shall be at the three ports Havre, Rouen, and Boulogne, and reinforcements subsequently arriving throughout the whole war shall make their accommodations there. The Expeditionary Corps landed in these ports remains there thirty-six hours. It will then be entrained at the railway stations near the ports, proceeds to the region of Amiens and Busigny, and will as a regular thing be detrained in the zone Maubeuge—Busigny—Hirson (i. e. opposite the Belgian frontier). In accordance with the measures adopted

the British Expeditionary Force will embrace: a general headquarters, two corps-headquarters, six infantry divisions, one cavalry division, two mounted brigades, army-troops and formations for the lines of communication. The total fighting strength of the troops will be 121,000 men."

50. Probably in the first instance Lloyd George's speech of July 21.

51. What follows is based on Poincaré's *Le Lendemain d'Agadir*, pp. 214-220. Also according to the letter of January 23, 1922 (mentioned in next preceding footnote) to the Ambassador at London Poincaré claimed that he himself initiated the correspondence: "*sur mes instructions*." Upon the publication of this statement no objection to it was made in England.

52. *German Documents on the Outbreak of the War*, no. 676. Italics mine.

53. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, pp. 112 ff. Italics mine.

54. "Cambon reminded me today," British *Blue Book* of 1914, no. 105.

55. *Livre Noir*, v. II, pp. 303-306.

56. For the explanation of how this legend originated see Montgelas, *The Case for the Central Powers*, pp. 81-84.

57. Prince Bülow, *Deutsche Politik*, Edition of 1917, p. 107.

58. Prof. M. Pokrowski, Chief of the Russian Archives, in the weekly "Pravda," no. 6, of March 2, 1919; reproduced in the German *White Book* of 1919, *Deutschland Schuldig?* pp. 192-193, translation by the Carnegie Endowment, p. 156.

59. *Livre Noir*, v. II, p. 321 ff.

60. Benckendorff to Sazonov, May 29 (June 11) 1914. *Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Isvolskis 1911-1914*. Im Auftrage des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes in deutscher

Uebertragung herausgegeben von Friedrich Stieve. 1924, v. IV, no. 1864.

61. *German Documents on the Outbreak of the War*, no. 5.

62. *Loc. cit.* no. 30.

63. Sir Julian Corbett, *Naval Operations*, v. I, p. 9. Fuller details regarding the whole negotiations by A. Bach in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, August, 1924.

64. *Kriegsschuldfrage*, June, 1926, p. 382.

65. Siebert, p. 678, and other passages.

66. *Livre Noir* II, p. 463 f., 466; Siebert, p. 675 f., 678, 681-684.

67. Compare here the Aide-Mémoire of the Russian Ambassador Saburoff of February 5, 1880. *Grosse Politik*, v. III, no. 517.

68. Siebert, p. 688; compare also *Deutsche Politik*, v. XXXIV, I, no. 12744 note.

69. Siebert, pp. 687-691.

70. M. Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars*.

71. G. von Jagow, *England und der Kriegsausbruch*, p. 31.

72. For the origin of the treaty see *Grosse Politik*, v. XIV, part I. According to what the King of Portugal told the German Minister at Lisbon (No. 3818) it was originally England's intention, by granting a loan to Portugal, which was badly in debt, to secure for herself a free hand in regulating the possession of the Portuguese colonies without the participation of third Powers. Germany and France learned of this and raised objections. After long drawn-out negotiations Count Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, obtained a far-reaching consideration of German interests. For the text of the treaties then made, see no. 3872. Portugal, however, rejected the offer of an Anglo-German loan, no. 3881.

73. *Grosse Politik*, v. III, no. 612, p. 306.

74. That England would fight on the side of France and Russia in case of war, had already on July 18 been described as probable by Under-Secretary of State Zimmerman, *German Documents on the Outbreak of the War*, Appendix IV no. 2, p. 129.

Part Two

1. Unless otherwise stated the numbers added to the text in parenthesis refer to *British Documents on the Origin of the War*, v. XI.

Abbreviations used for other Collections of Documents:

BB = British *Blue Book* of 1914.

F = French *Yellow Book* of 1914.

G = *German Documents on the Outbreak of the War* (so-called Kautsky Documents).

2. The documents prior to July 20 were not included in BB.

3. Not printed in BB.

4. C. Oman: *The Outbreak of the War of 1914-1918*, p. 18.

5. Only no. 86 (Conversation with Mensdorff or no. 3) was included in BB; but numbers 67, 76, and 79 were not.

6. This pronouncement was as follows: "In the comments of the European press upon the tension prevailing in the relations of Austria-Hungary to Serbia there is an ever-growing tendency to recognize the fact that Austria-Hungary's demand for a clarifying of her relations to Serbia is justified. At the same time we share in the hope variously expressed that a serious crisis will be avoided by Serbia's giving ground in good time. In any case the solidarity of European interests hitherto brought into play in preserving the peace among the Great Powers during the long Balkan crisis makes it appear desirable and urgently

called for that the complications that may arise between Austria-Hungary and Serbia remain localized."

7. No. 77 corresponds to BB 2, where, however, the words of the Serbian representative about the press of his country were omitted.

8. The three numbers 29, 61, and 80 were not printed in BB.

9. In the new British documents the time of arrival of telegrams as given is the time when the deciphering clerk of the Foreign Office began work on them. According to the length of the dispatch one or two hours might elapse before the decoded dispatch was laid before the political officials.

10. Nicolson wrote to Grey, then absent from London, in reference to a proposal of Sazonov and sent his chief at once drafts for the telegrams to all the interested Powers (no. 139). Grey signed them without informing himself carefully about the situation, which had been incorrectly described by Nicolson (nos. 140 and 144).

11. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, pp. 195 and 198.

12. Not included in BB.

13. Benckendorff also refused to hear anything of a conference. (Grey, v. I, p. 308.)

14. This letter was suppressed in BB, but has since been published in Grey's *Twenty-five Years* (v. I, p. 307).

15. Russian *Orange Book* of 1914, no. 22.

16. That Austria must immediately meet the Russian mobilization with a complete mobilization, was evidently taken for granted in London, too. The strange notion that Austria should permit the Russians to mobilize on her frontier without doing anything against such mobilization, arose later on in the heads of Entente writers.

17. In the case of the British documents not sent by telegraph—as was also true of the German ones—only the

day but not the hour of posting or receiving them is given. It may be concluded that this letter was written before the Austrian declaration of war because it makes no mention of the event.

18. The numbers 61, 80, and 221 were not included in the BB.

19. Corresponds to BB 71, where, however, Bethmann's complaint about the tone of the French press was cut out.

20. Corresponds to BB 24, where, however, the passage here quoted, together with a fresh appeal of Sazonov for English solidarity, was stricken out.

21. The reports on military details were on principle not included in BB; only one exception was made in the case of the fanciful reports of the French Ambassador.

22. Even after proclamation of the "state of imminent danger of war" on July 31st at 1 p.m. "no supplementary troops were called to the colors, and no bodies of troops were moved from the interior of the Empire to the frontier; on the other hand, the troops of the frontier corps on a peace footing took over the protection of the frontier and of the railways in their districts." Work of the Reichsarchiv, *Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918*, v. I, p. 102.

23. Headlam-Morley attempts to discredit this information, which was given by the Spanish Ambassador to his British colleague, by saying that it was "of no real evidential value" and "not worth reporting." As a matter of fact, the Spanish Ambassador was very well informed, as Poincaré and Messimy, the French War Minister at that time, have expressly confirmed. (Poincaré, *Les Origines de la Guerre*, p. 255; Messimy in R. Recouly, *Les Heures Tragiques d'Avant-Guerre*, p. 76.)

24. Suppressed in BB 17, which is otherwise sharply abbreviated.

British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey

25. This, with two other important sentences, suppressed in BB. Italics are mine.

26. Printed as no. 113 in BB without date of dispatch or hour of arrival. Italics are mine.

27. The other telegrams London-St. Petersburg on July 30th and 31st required: 3 hours (a very brief telegram), 4, 7, 11½, 12½, and 5½ hours. It is a striking fact that the telegram in question here is without a number. The records of the British Embassy at St. Petersburg should contain an explanation with regard to the number and the hour when it was sent off.

28. This telegram was wholly suppressed in BB. In the new documents it bears the hour of dispatch August 1, 3:10 P. M. (equivalent to 1:10 London time), but the date is July 31. The hour of dispatch must be, not that from St. Petersburg, but from some intermediate station. It cannot be assumed that a fact observed on July 31 in an early morning hour was not reported till the afternoon of the following day.

29. Hansard, *Parl. Debates*, Commons v. LXV, col. 1787-1788.

30. In no. 119 BB. these two sentences were suppressed. Italics are mine.

31. Italics are mine. In BB. no. 108 Goschen's telegram was completely thrown into confusion through omissions and transpositions. The portion cited here within quotation marks was wholly suppressed, the mention of Russian mobilization against Austria is placed in the lead, so that the impression given by the 1914 publication necessarily was that the Chancellor was complaining chiefly of Russia's mobilization against Austria.

32. P. Renouvin: *Les Origines immédiates de la Guerre*, p. 198.

33. This paragraph is based upon Headlam-Morley's remarks upon no. 819.

34. Grey's *Twenty-five Years*, v. I, p. 319.

35. Not printed in BB. In reality France had attached to her request to St. Petersburg the tricky advice to continue mobilization in secrecy; *Livre Noir*, v. II, p. 289-290.

36. Grey, v. I, p. 327.

37. Grey, v. I, p. 319.

38. The expectation of armed resistance was not only repeated to Belgium on August 4, but was also extended to Norway and Holland (No. 578).

39. Composition of House of Commons as of November 1, 1913: 260 Liberals, 40 Labor Party, 83 Irish, 382 Unionists (Conservatives).

40. This Cabinet vote was suppressed in BB. 119.

41. Grey claims never to have used this expression (*Twenty-five Years*, I, p. 5).

42. Bourgeois and Pagès, *Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre*, p. 58.

43. Published in BB as no. 134. The occasion for this French note, however, has only now become manifest, and likewise the full scope of its dangerous effect.

44. Accounts of Churchill's activity here and in following paragraphs are based upon his book, *The World Crisis*, I, p. 215 ff.

45. The three numbers 419, 453, and 460 are lacking in BB.

46. Both these numbers were suppressed in BB.

47. This important sentence is not given even in the new British documents.

48. Grey says in his book (v. II, p. 2) that the question of the protection of the French coasts was first brought up by the peace wing of the Cabinet. From numbers 424, 426, and 447, however, it is seen that Cambon was the first to bring it forward.

49. How easily mistakes about aircraft, etc., were possible at that time is shown among other cases by a report

from Brussels that in the night of August 2 three German airships were seen there (No. 521).

50. The German declaration was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office in Berlin at 9:30 A. M. (G 714 note), and in course of the forenoon ("this morning") it reached the Foreign Office (No. 531).

Part Three

1. "New Régime" means post-Bismarckian Germany.

2. It was on July 18, 1891, that the decisive step was taken on the Russian side by Minister Giers. A short time before this Emperor William had made a rather long visit to England, including also the country home of Lord Salisbury. Minister Rudini had announced noisily in the Italian Parliament the renewal of the Triple Alliance and Italy's good relations with England, and the British Fleet had touched at Italian and Austrian ports. Grey himself makes Bismarck's spirit say: "indeed the Alliance seemed directed more against England than against Germany." *Twenty-five Years*, v. I, p. 233.

3. H. W. Steed, *Through Thirty Years*, v. I, p. 47.

4. The expression "unprecedented strength" was used in 1912 (v. I, p. 288), before the German Army Bill of 1913.

5. See the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, May, 1926, p. 338, for the manifesto prepared by the Archduke for the event of his ascending the throne.

Main DA566.9.G8 M6
Montegelas, Maximilian Maria Karl
British foreign policy under Sir Edward



7 5108 00112608 5
DENISON UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

APR 25 '40 OCT. - 31 1980

My 20 '40

My 21 '40

My 24 '40

DA
566.9
.G8M6

62320

